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The high operations and maintenance (O&M) cost for nuclear plants is one of the most 
significant challenges facing the industry today. The research in this thesis is motivated by the 
ongoing effort to utilize automation and improved operator support technologies to reduce O&M 
costs in nuclear power plants. A diagnostic framework is first developed for the problem of 
monitoring equipment health and sensor calibration status in nuclear engineering systems. This is 
achieved by utilizing real-time data from sensors that are already in place for system monitoring 
to perform automated diagnostics of equipment degradation. Given the long-time scale over 
which component degradation typically proceeds, some of the sensors may also inevitably 
degrade and become unreliable. The need to simultaneously consider equipment and instrument 
faults is both a technical necessity and a desired capability. The automation of these monitoring 
tasks contributes to the reduction of the overall O&M cost by reducing the required human 
resources and by providing better maintenance scheduling. 
Early detection of slow degradation over the course of plant operation requires sufficient 
detection sensitivity from the diagnostic framework. The problem is more complicated in the 
presence of various sources of uncertainty and possible changes of operating conditions due to 
plant drifts. To resolve these difficulties and provide the desired capability, the proposed 
framework is a hybrid integration of quantitative model-based diagnosis, statistical change 
detection and probabilistic reasoning. Physics-based models are developed to describe the fault-
free behavior of system components. Quantitative residuals are generated from the analytical 
redundancy in each model and serve as fault symptoms for model-based diagnosis. Statistical 
change detection methods are used to detect changes in the residuals in the presence of 
uncertainty. Measurement and modelling uncertainty are robustly treated by methods of 
statistical change detection and probabilistic reasoning. A system level diagnosis framework is 
proposed to deal with the lack of local sensors to each component.  
Abstract
 xii
The overall framework has been implemented and demonstrated with a high-pressure feedwater 
system whose available sensor set is insufficient for the construction of standalone models for 
most major components. Results from the demonstration showed that the system level approach 
can be used to construct models and perform diagnostics for systems with limited 
instrumentation. Both component faults and sensor faults can be detected, and the effects of 
uncertainty can be mitigated by the proposed probabilistic reasoning framework.  Areas for 
future work were identified and include the investigation of a dynamic Bayesian network to treat 
the effects of uncertainty in the diagnosis as well as the investigation of using high fidelity 
simulation codes to construct simulation-based surrogate models of the basic plant components.
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The global energy demand is rising rapidly as a result of population and economic growth. A 
recent report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration projects a 50% increase in world 
energy consumption between 2018 and 2050 [1]. At the same time, the impact of greenhouse 
gases emission from energy production is an issue of global concerns, motivating the search for 
cleaner energy sources. From a technical perspective, nuclear energy can be a crucial part of the 
solution to both issues. However, to the opposite effect, nuclear power is struggling and its 
contribution to the energy solution does not live up to its potential. 
The main challenges facing the nuclear industry originated from both safety and cost concerns. 
The economic competition from other lower-cost alternatives makes nuclear energy, even with 
its numerous benefits, less desirable. To improve the viability of the nuclear power, technology 
advancements must be made in both safety enhancement and cost reduction [2]. Parallel with 
progress in the development of advanced fuel cycle and reactor design, advances in operator 
support technologies are crucial for improving the safety and efficiency of nuclear power plant 
operations. 
The use of operator support technologies is twofold: at the control level, a computerized operator 
support system can assist plant operators in making timely and informed decisions; at the 
maintenance level, it can help monitoring the overall equipment condition and system status, 
improving maintenance scheduling and reducing the need for human resources [3, 4]. The study 
in this thesis is part of the effort to utilize automation and operator support technologies in 
reducing the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost in nuclear power plants. Fault diagnosis 
methods are investigated and developed for application to the problems of monitoring equipment 
health and instrumentation calibration status. 
Chapter 1  
Introduction and Motivation 
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More specifically, the focus of the diagnostic problem is on equipment performance degradation 
in the thermal-hydraulic systems over the course of plant operation. Information regarding the 
status of the system can be collected and analyzed periodically from sensor data. Given the long-
time scale over which component degradation typically proceeds, some of the system monitoring 
sensors may also inevitably degrade and become unreliable. Sensors in nuclear power plants are 
typically only calibrated once every fuel cycle. The calibration activity requires significant 
human resources in detecting faulty instruments and recalibrating them. Automated on-line 
calibration monitoring can be performed during plant operation to detect sensor drifts as they 
occur and ultimately reduce the O&M cost [5]. It is therefore desirable to have a diagnostic tool 
with the capability to simultaneously deal with both component faults and sensor faults.  
The principal objective of this work is the development of a theoretical framework for 
performing fault detection and diagnosis in the thermal-hydraulic systems of nuclear power 
plants. Basic capabilities for this purpose were previously developed at Argonne National 
Laboratory in the computer code PRO-AID, originally known as PRODIAG [6, 7, 8]. This thesis 
will build upon PRO-AID by developing a new diagnostic framework to overcome its limitations 
and improve its capability and applicability. The principal target application for the approach 
developed here is for immediate implementation in currently operating nuclear power plants, 
however the methods developed here also would potentially have application for the design and 
operation of advanced nuclear reactor systems. Practical conditions in terms of available sensor 
sets and other available data and information are taken into consideration in the development. 
Afterwards, the diagnostic framework may be applied to the problem of determining the optimal 
placement for new sensors to improve the monitoring capabilities. 
PRO-AID [6] was designed as a rule-based expert system for the detection and diagnosis of 
upset events in thermal-hydraulic (T-H) systems of nuclear power plants, relying exclusively on 
T-H instrumentation readings. Faults or malfunctions in any component of a system would result 
in changing trends of T-H variables. PRO-AID emulates a “human expert” observing individual 
changing trends in T-H variables and makes diagnostic decisions using a knowledge base 
provided by a collection of reasoning rules. Changing trends are considered fault symptoms and 
the knowledge base can provide inferences based on the symptoms allowing the code to deduce 
the nature of the fault. The knowledge base of PRO-AID is constructed based mainly from the 
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qualitative form of conservation equations. The approach in PRO-AID is function-oriented in the 
sense that component malfunctions are expected to affect the component’s ability to perform its 
design function. Since each generic component in a T-H system is designed to perform a specific 
function of either mass, momentum or energy transfer, a component malfunction would lead to 
an imbalance in at least one of the conservation equations. 
The rule-based qualitative reasoning approach in PRO-AID offers several advantages. If the 
knowledge base is complete and the relevant symptoms are observed, the code can execute the 
reasoning process efficiently and mistake-free. In this sense, the code can operate as human 
experts without the human error factors. On the other hand, since the code only observes the 
system qualitatively, there is a limit on what it can deduce, especially when observations are 
limited to T-H variable signals. Since some information is lost when the conservation equations 
are converted into qualitative form, the instrumentation signals available may not be fully 
utilized. In addition, as the code considers all changing trends as direct fault symptoms, it can 
only be applicable for situations when that assumption is valid, i.e. for faults that are severe 
enough to cause direct detectable changing trends and only in a short time window before 
feedbacks and automated control actions come into effect and begin to overlay the symptoms. 
Further complications arise when one must consider system noise and measurement uncertainties 
which make the task of detecting correct changing trends nontrivial. In general, the current 
version of PRO-AID can only detect abrupt faults and is not applicable for slow degradations in 
the time frame during which where feedbacks and control system actions may interfere. 
Considering the limitations of the qualitative approach in PRO-AID, a new quantitative model-
based approach is developed and presented in this thesis. In developing this new approach, 
similar restrictions as imposed in the previous version of PRO-AID are applied: to rely solely on 
instrumentation signals and not require any component-specific design parameters. This is due to 
the business case of the target application. Ultimately, the objective for the development of fault 
detection and diagnosis tools such as PRO-AID is to reduce the cost of operations and 
maintenance activities in nuclear power plants. For that purpose, having the approach involve 
design parameters that require subject matter experts for setup and maintenance would be 
economically counterproductive.  
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The most significant original contribution of this work to the field is the development of a 
physics-based probabilistic framework for system level diagnosis in complex nuclear 
engineering systems with limited instrumentation. The proposed framework has the capability to 
deal with both equipment faults and instrument faults. For most systems with limited 
instrumentation, because of the lack of sensors locally at component level, it is not possible to 
perform diagnostics for every standalone component which limits the overall detection and 
monitoring capability. The framework proposed in this thesis resolves this limitation by utilizing 
the relations between nearby components and sensors available at the system level. Furthermore, 
one of the challenging issues in engineering applications of model-based diagnosis methods is 
the difficulty in developing sufficiently accurate models for the diagnostic purpose. High 
modeling uncertainty may result in unreliable diagnostic results which limit the applicability of 
model-based methods. In this thesis, a probabilistic reasoning framework using the Bayesian 
network method has been developed to robustly deal with modeling uncertainty and other 
inevitable sources of noise and uncertainty in engineering systems. 
1.1 Overview of the Diagnostic Problem 
Information on the structure of a T-H system will be specified by a piping and instrumentation 
diagram (P&ID). An example of a P&ID is shown in Figure 1-1 for the chemical and volume 
control system (CVCS) of the Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station [8]. The P&ID provides a 
list of all components and sensors as well as specify their locations, interconnections and the 
fluid flow directions. The basic objective of fault diagnosis in a system is to detect when a fault 
has occurred and if possible, localize the fault to a specific component or sensor. 
A fault is defined to be any change in a component or sensor that affects its performance of the 
designed function. Generally, faults in a nuclear power plant can be divided into two categories 
based on the underlying time scale. The first type, occurring abruptly in a short-time scale, is 
relevant to the control of the plant and thus must be detected and dealt which by human operators 
in the control room. The second type is performance degradation, occurring slowly in the long-
time scale over the course of plant operation. Slow performance degradation may go undetected 
even with plant staff performing routine maintenance rounds and is typically dealt with during 
periodic maintenance intervals. The current research will focus on the second category - faults of 
slow degradation type.  
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Figure 1-1. Simplified P&ID of the Braidwood Nuclear Station CVCS [8] 
 
Given the long-time scale in consideration, the degradation of the monitoring instruments is also 
inevitable, e.g. sensors drifting out of calibration. Additionally, the system may undergo changes 
in operation conditions due to control actions or other changes in boundary conditions such as 
seasonal temperature changes. The problem is more complicated with the presence of various 
sources of noise and uncertainty. The desired diagnostic approach should have the capability to 
deal with both component faults and sensor faults, have high detection sensitivity to detect slow 
degradations but remain insensitive to the various sources of uncertainty and changes in 
operating conditions. 
The theoretical framework for fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) proposed in this thesis is a 
hybrid integration of quantitative model-based diagnosis, statistical change detection and 
probabilistic reasoning. Quantitative physics-based models are constructed to describe the 
normal, fault-free, behavior of each component in a T-H system. These component models 
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provide the source of analytical redundancy needed to perform fault diagnostics. Discrepancies 
between fault-free model predictions and measurement data provided by sensor readings are 
quantified by model residuals. Non-zero residuals are interpreted as fault symptoms in fault 
detection and diagnosis. With the presence of various sources of uncertainty, a statistical change 
detection method is needed to reliably evaluate whether a residual has become non-zero 
statistically. Every time a decision is made on whether a residual is zero or non-zero, there is an 
associated false detection rate. Taking account of such false detection possibilities in a 
probabilistic reasoning approach is one of the issues addressed in this work. 
The construction of each component model for fault diagnosis requires measured data of a 
certain number of process variables at the inlet and outlet of the component. In practice, it is 
rarely the case that there are enough sensors on the boundary of each component for that 
purpose. Incorporating information from the system level into the model construction process 
and subsequently in fault diagnosis is one of the original contributions of this thesis. Difficulties 
due to the lack of sensors are dealt with in system level diagnosis using aggregate models and a 
new concept of virtual sensor. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 starts with a review on various fault detection and diagnosis methods and their 
applications with focus on model-based diagnosis methods. The qualitative approach in PRO-
AID is discussed next along with its advantage and limitations. The last section of Chapter 2 
introduces two quantitative model-based diagnosis frameworks, each provides a reasoning 
process to obtain fault diagnoses from a set of observed fault symptoms. These two reasoning 
frameworks will be used as the basis for the work in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 deals with the construction of physics-based models for model-based diagnosis and the 
difficulties involved. From each model, one or several residuals can be computed and utilized in 
detecting fault symptoms. An example with a single-phase counterflow heat exchanger is 
discussed in detail to illustrate the model construction and residual generation processes. 
In Chapter 4, various sources of uncertainty in a system and their effects on fault detection and 
diagnosis are discussed. The presence of noise and uncertainty affects not only the process of 
observing fault symptoms from sensor readings but also the reasoning process going from a set 
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of observed fault symptoms to possible fault diagnoses. Statistical change detection methods to 
detect non-zero residuals are introduced. If the false detection rates in evaluating model residuals 
can be considered negligible, the straightforward approach for the reasoning process is to accept 
the set of observed fault symptoms as definite and proceed with one of the two reasoning 
frameworks introduced in Chapter 2. Such approach is called ‘deterministic reasoning’ as the 
possibility that any observed fault symptom could be false is neglected. 
Chapter 5 introduces the probabilistic reasoning framework proposed in this study. The 
possibility of false detection rates in evaluating the model residuals are estimated and accounted 
for in the reasoning processes. Details on the concept of Bayesian network and the application in 
probabilistic reasoning are discussed.  
Chapter 6 discusses the problem of fault diagnosis at system level. As is often the case, the 
sensor set available at the boundary of a component is incomplete hence it is not possible to 
construct a model for the standalone component. One must utilize the relations between nearby 
components and make use of all available sensors at the system level to maximize the diagnostic 
capability. The concepts of virtual sensors and aggregate models are introduced for that purpose. 
Issues with residual generation and fault diagnosis at system level are also discussed. 
Chapter 7 provides results for several diagnostic scenarios for a feedwater system in the North 
Anna Nuclear Generating Station. The overall process from importing and analyzing the P&ID 
for possible virtual sensors to constructing all possible diagnostic models, generating model 
residuals and performing diagnosis has been automated in a test implementation. Diagnostic 
results for various scenarios, including feedwater heat fouling, sensor fault and pump fault are 
discussed. Possible application of the proposed framework on the problem of determining 
optimal placements for new sensors is also illustrated. 
The final chapter provides a summary of the work and proposes various directions for future 
work. 
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Fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) is an essential part of process control and abnormal event 
management in any engineering and industrial system. A fault is any change to the 
characteristics of some component in the system that could reduce or disrupt its ability to 
perform the designed function. Fault detection techniques are usually employed to monitor the 
system to ensure its efficient working conditions and enhance system safety and reliability. The 
use of advanced FDD techniques for early detection of faults would allow for timely execution 
of remedial control actions and for the orderly planning of maintenance activities. 
Generally, most FDD methods detect faults by either analyzing inconsistencies in the observed 
data or by matching the observed data to known fault modes. Inconsistencies in sensor data can 
be detected by either hardware or analytical redundancy. In a hardware redundancy approach, 
identical instruments or components are used for the same purpose and their outputs are 
compared for cross validation. Hardware redundancy is costly and therefore only feasibly 
applicable for safety-critical applications. The analytical redundancy approaches, on the other 
hand, rely a priori knowledge of the system for consistency checking. Alternatively, faults can be 
detected by matching the observed data against known fault models or signal features. 
Reviews of FDD methods are available in a great variety of books [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] 
and journal papers [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26].  In general, FDD methods can be 
classified into two main categories: model-based and process-history-based. Briefly, in model-
based approaches, mathematical models of the system or its individual components are 
constructed to either provide a source of analytical redundancy or describe the system faulty 
behaviors. Process-history-based approaches include data-driven methods and signal-based 
methods. For data-driven methods, the availability of a large amount of process history data is 
Chapter 2  
Fault Detection and Diagnosis Methods 
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required. Various data processing and pattern recognition techniques can be applied to formulate 
constraints between different sensor readings in the observed data. Signal-based methods on the 
other hand are univariate and rely on numerical features of individual sensor readings, e.g. 
vibration or acoustic sensors. 
In practice, there is not always a clear distinction between these methods and the advantage of 
one over the others. For instance, system models can be constructed by data-driven techniques to 
be used in model-based methods. When considering various FDD techniques for industrial 
applications, a common consensus is that there is no single method that can satisfy all the 
desirable features for a specific application. The optimal solution can only be reached by 
combining different methods in a hybrid form [17, 23]. 
2.1 Industrial Applications of FDD Methods 
In data-driven approaches, multivariate data analysis and supervised learning techniques are 
applied to large sets of process history data to detect process faults. Data-driven methods can be 
divided into two categories, namely pattern recognition approaches and data reconstruction 
approaches [19].  
In the first category, the problem of fault diagnosis is formulated as a pattern recognition 
problem or a classifier. Quantitative features are exacted from the set of process history data and 
classified by different classes, each of which is associated with a specific type of faults. Faults 
are detected when the features of the observed data are recognized by a pre-determined class. 
Feature extraction methods include principle component analysis (PCA) [27, 28, 29, 30, 31], 
independent component analysis (ICA) [32, 33, 34, 35, 36], partial least square (PLS) [37, 38, 
39, 40], linear discriminant analysis (LDA) [41, 42]. Classifier methods include support vector 
machine (SVM) [43, 44, 45, 46, 47], artificial neural network (ANN) [48, 49, 50, 51].  
In the second category of data-driven approaches, quantitative models obtained from process 
data are used to reconstruct part of the observed data. Faults are detected from the discrepancies 
between measured data and the model estimations. Methods for data reconstruction include ANN 
and other supervised machine learning techniques [19] and multivariate state estimation 
technique (MSET) [52, 53, 54] 
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Signal-based approaches utilize univariate sensor signals for fault diagnosis, as opposed to 
multivariate process data in data-driven approaches. Numerical features are extracted from 
individual sensor readings from which faults can be detected and recognized. Signal features can 
be classified into three categories: time-domain, frequency domain and joint time-frequency 
domain. Time-domain features can be extracted from continuous dynamical process variables 
usually in terms of statistical parameters [55, 23, 56]. Frequency-domain features can be exacted 
using spectrum analysis tools from relevant sensors, e.g. vibration or acoustic sensors. 
Frequency-domain signal-based approaches have been widely applied for fault detection using in 
pump motors and other rotating machineries using vibration sensors [57, 58, 59], in industrial 
systems using acoustic sensors [60, 61]. In joint time-frequency domain approaches, time-
variations of frequency-domain features are monitored and from which faults can be detected 
[62, 63, 64]. 
In model-based approaches, models are constructed to provide description of the structure and 
behavior of a system. Faults are detected by analyzing inconsistencies between observed data 
and the expected behavior for from matching observations to expected faulty features. 
Inconsistencies in measurement data are detected from available analytical redundancy relations 
which are quantified by model residuals in quantitative approaches. Depending on the form of a 
system model, different techniques are available for the residual generation, including fault 
detection filter [65, 66], diagnostic observer [67, 13], parity space [68, 17, 67], parameter 
estimation [69, 17]. 
2.2 Fundamentals of Model-Based Diagnosis 
The characteristics of the diagnostic problem in this thesis is the need to consider complex 
systems with large numbers of components but limited sensor sets. Under such scenarios, it is 
not always possible to identify the exact root cause of each upset event and the spatial resolution 
of the diagnostic results may include multiple components or sensors. We will first investigate 
possible reasoning frameworks to obtain such diagnostic results from a set of observations. The 
effects of various sources of uncertainty to the reasoning process are discussed in Chapter 4 and 
5. For the current section, we will provide formal definitions of faults, fault symptoms, fault 
diagnoses and discuss the fundamental reasoning framework for model-based fault diagnosis. 
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Model-based diagnosis (MBD) is a general framework for fault detection and diagnosis making 
use of models of the structure and behavior of the system in consideration. The idea of model-
based diagnosis as a method that uses analytical redundancy for fault detection can be traced 
back to the work of Beard [65] and de Kleer [70]. The common approach to model-based 
diagnosis is to rely on models that describe the normal, fault-free, behavior of a system. Faults 
can be detected from discrepancies between model predictions and observed data [71, 72]. This 
approach, formally known as consistency-based, will be the focus of development in this thesis. 
It should be noted that there is an alternative approach, known as abductive diagnosis, relying on 
abnormal models that describe the behavior a system in faulty modes. Faults or malfunctions are 
detected when their predicted abnormal behaviors match the observed data [73, 74, 75].   
The logical framework of consistency-based approach for model-based diagnosis was introduced 
and formalized by Reiter [76] and de Kleer [77]. A detailed description of the approach was 
provided by de Kleer in [13] for a simplified system of an electronic circuit. In this section, we 
will generalize that framework to treat systems with the possibility of multiple fault modes in 
system components as well as sensor faults. 
To start, a system in model-based diagnosis is defined by a complete description of its structure, 
a list of fault-free models for the components in the system and a list of observations obtained 
from various locations in the system: 
Definition 2-1. A system is a triple ( , , )SD COMPS OBS , where: 
 SD - System Description: specifies the structure of the system, 
including a list of all components, sensors, and their interconnections. 
 COMPS  - System Components: a list of models that describe the 
normal (fault-free) behavior of each component 
 OBS - Observations: List of data, observed at various locations in the 
system. 
Each component model provides an analytical relation between the process variables on the 
boundary of the component. The component models together constitute a fault-free system 
model which imposes various relations and constraints on the observed data. For the formulation 
in this section, we shall assume that all component models are provided. Furthermore, all sources 
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of uncertainty, including modeling uncertainty and measurement uncertainty, are neglected. 
Complications in the development of component models and uncertainty treatment will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 5, respectively. 
A component fault is any change in the characteristics of a component that can cause it to deviate 
from the expected normal behavior. A sensor fault is any change to a sensor that causes its 
reading value to no longer reflect the true value of the underlying process variable. If the system 
is fault-free, the observed data provided by sensor readings must satisfy the relations and 
constraints imposed by the fault-free system model. In that case, we say that the observations are 
consistent with the fault-free system model. Consequently, any inconsistency between the set of 
observations and the fault-free system model is defined to be a fault symptom. 
Definition 2-2. A fault symptom is an inconsistency detected between the set of 
observations and the fault-free system model. 
Following the underlying physics, each physical state of the system would result in a specific 
combination of fault symptoms. That specific combination of fault symptoms will be referred to 
as the fault signature of the state. An upset event is detected when one or more fault symptoms 
are observed. The objective of fault diagnosis is then to deduce the state of the system from a set 
of observed fault symptoms. 
To elaborate, suppose that there are N  possible faults in the system, each can be denoted by a 
label iF  with 1 i N  . Each physical state of the system can be then identified by a set of faults. 
Thus, the space of physical states consists of 2N  possible states. Now, suppose that the set of 
available observations and the fault-free system model allow us to construct n  distinct fault 
symptoms. There are then 2n  possible combinations of fault symptoms.  
The causal relations from the underlying physics dictates that to each physical state of the 
system, there is a specific set of fault symptoms defined to be its fault signature. That is, one can 
theoretically construct a function that maps each set of faults to a specific set of fault symptoms. 
The term function is to emphasize that each set of faults is mapped to one and only one set of 
fault symptoms. Each physical state cannot have more than one signature. On the other hand, it is 
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possible that different physical states can share the same fault signature, i.e. different sets of 
faults can be mapped to the same set of fault symptoms. 
 
Figure 2-1. Forward mapping from physical states to fault signatures 
The forward mapping from physical states to fault signatures in the space of combinations of 
fault symptoms is illustrated in Figure 2-1. Mathematically, the map is injective but not 
surjective. Every physical state is mapped into a fault signature but not every combination of 
symptoms is the signature of a physical state. If a set of fault symptoms is a fault signature to 
some state, we say the set of fault symptoms represents the state. Then among the 2n  possible 
combinations of fault symptoms, some combinations do not represent any physical states while 
the others may represent one or multiple states. Usually, the number of distinct fault symptoms 
in the system is less than the number of possible faults, thus 2 2n N , and we can see clearly the 
mapping from 2N  distinct states to 2n  different sets of symptoms cannot be one-to-one. 
The objective of fault diagnosis is to determine the physical state of a system given a set of 
observed fault symptoms. As we have seen, different states can give the same fault signature and 
therefore it is not always possible to identify the exact state of a system. One must settle with all 
possible states that can yield the set of observed symptoms. Each point in the space of physical 
states can be a guess for the actual state of the system. More formally, we define a diagnosis to 
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be any hypothesis on the state of a system in the attempt to explain the observed fault symptoms. 
A diagnosis is valid if the corresponding state yields the observed set of fault symptoms.  
Mathematically, the task of determining all valid diagnoses is equivalent to finding the inverse 
mapping from the space of fault symptoms to the space of physical states. 
 
Figure 2-2. Backward mapping from a set of fault symptoms to possible states in fault diagnosis 
If one can enumerate all the faults in the systems and can construct the forward mapping, as 
shown in Figure 2-1, from each state to a set of symptoms, then the task of fault diagnosis can be 
done straightforwardly. All valid diagnoses can be found by a simple search for all physical 
states whose fault signature matches the observed set of symptoms. However, it is usually not 
practical to construct the forward mapping, especially for complex systems with high number of 
continuous fault modes. Furthermore, it is not computationally efficient to perform diagnosis by 
enumerating all possible states of the system. As shown, the number of possible states increases 
exponentially with the number of faults. 
The objective of the MBD framework formulated here is to determine all valid diagnoses for a 
given set of symptoms without the need to construct the forward mapping by employing a 
reasoning method known as backward chaining inference. Valid diagnoses are logically inferred 
from the implications provided by the observed fault symptoms. 
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For that, we first need to express each diagnosis in the form of a logical statement. Intuitively, 
each diagnosis with a set of faults is a logical statement claiming those faults to be present in the 
system. Any component or sensor not implicated by this set of faults is implicitly presumed to be 
fault-free.  
Definition 2-3. A diagnosis with a set of faults fC  is the hypothesis that the 
faults included in fC  have occurred and the rest of the system is fault-free. 
                               )(
i i
iF C F Cf if f
C F F
 
   
     
   
                   (2.1) 
where   is the logical ‘AND’ operator;   is the logical negation and iF  is the 
label for a particular fault. 
 
We will use a short-handed notation to write each diagnosis by a list of fault labels inside the 
square brackets ‘[ ] ’. For instance, 1 2[ , ]F F  is the diagnosis claiming that only faults 1F   and 2F  
have occurred. 
Again, at any moment of time, there can be only one diagnosis matching the actual state of the 
system, but we must settle with all the diagnoses that are consistent with the observed symptoms. 
We defined those to be valid diagnoses, or more formally, consistency-based diagnoses. More 
specifically, a diagnosis is called a consistency-based diagnosis if its set of faults can account for 
all the inconsistencies between the observations and the fault-free system model.  
For each abnormal event detected by a specific set of observed fault symptoms, we are interested 
in obtaining the list of all consistency-based diagnoses.  From a practical point of view, however, 
it might be helpful to narrow such list down by removing some less useful diagnoses at the 
tradeoff of some comprehensiveness. That is, it is not practically useful to consider all 
mathematically valid solutions and one may consider removing some of the less probable 
diagnoses. In the current framework, we will do this by introducing the concept of minimal 
diagnosis and consider keeping only minimal diagnoses in the diagnostic result. 
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To see the logic behind the use of minimal diagnoses, consider a scenario in which we have 
obtained a list of all valid diagnoses for a given set of fault symptoms. Suppose that among the 
list of valid diagnoses, there exists a group of related diagnoses 0 )(C , 1)(C ,…, )( nC  such 
that the first member of the group is a subset of all the other members, i.e. 0  for all 1iC C i  . 
Every diagnosis in this group is just 0 )(C  plus at least one additional fault. In other words, for 
any diagnosis )( iC  in the group with 1i  , we can remove at least one fault from its set of 
faults iC  and still have a valid diagnosis. The same cannot be said for 0 )(C ; we cannot remove 
any of its faults and still retain a valid diagnosis. In this case, 0 )(C  is called a minimal 
diagnosis. 
From a practical point of view, for the purpose of reducing the number of possibilities one needs 
to consider in the diagnostic result, it is a reasonable choice to focus only on the minimal 
diagnosis 0 )(C  and ignore the other non-minimal members of the group. In terms of actionable 
information, every diagnosis in the group implies the set of faults 0C  in 0 )(C . In terms of prior 
probability, assuming the faults are independent, it is clear that the minimal diagnosis 0 )(C  is 
the most likely candidate among the group, regardless of what the prior probability of each fault 
might be. The prior probability of each diagnosis )( iC  in the group with at least one additional 
fault compared to 0 )(C  is smaller than the prior probability of 0 )(C . (To be precise, the 
requirement for this statement to hold is that the prior probability of each fault is less that 50%  
which we can safely assume to always be the case for all practical purposes).  
Formally, a valid consistency-based diagnosis 0 )(C  is called a minimal diagnosis if there is no 
proper subset 0C
  of 0C   such that 0 )(C
  is also a consistency-based diagnosis. Given a list of 
all valid diagnoses, we can divide it to separate groups of related diagnoses as described and 
from that obtain all minimal diagnoses. It should be noted that the term “minimal” here does not 
necessarily imply a minimum number of faults. For instance it could be the case that both 
1 2[ , ]F F  and 3[ ]F , for some fault labels 1 2 3, ,F F F , are valid minimal diagnoses and without 
considering the prior probabilities, one has no basis to prefer one minimal diagnosis to another.  
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Definition 2-4. A minimal diagnosis is a valid consistency-based diagnosis such 
that none of its proper subsets is also a valid diagnosis. 
 
The use of the minimal diagnosis concept allows one to logically remove some of the less useful 
diagnoses, thus reduces the number of diagnoses one needs to consider. The tradeoff is that in the 
unlikely event that multiple faults occur in a system and the actual state of the system 
corresponds to a non-minimal diagnosis then by only considering minimal diagnoses, one may 
miss some of the multiple faults. 
The objective of model-based diagnosis is then to obtain all minimal diagnoses for a given set of 
observed fault symptoms. In framework of MBD, minimal diagnoses are deduced by logical 
inference using the information obtained from each fault symptom. Each fault symptom 
represents an inconsistency between the observations and the fault-free system model. From each 
fault symptom, one can conclude that at least one of the involved components or sensors must be 
faulty. Such statement is known as a conflict. Formally, a conflict, identified by a set of faults fC
, is defined to be the logical statement claiming at least one fault in fC  must be true.  
Definition 2-5. A conflict for a set of faults fC  is the statement that at least one 









   (2.2) 
where   is the logical ‘OR’ operator. 
 
In that context, a conflict among some set of fault fC  is valid if the observed fault symptoms 
cannot be explained without at least one fault in fC . Parallel to the definition of minimal 
diagnosis, a minimal conflict is defined to be a valid conflict such that none of its proper subsets 
is also a valid conflict. One cannot remove any fault from the set of faults in a minimal conflict 
without invalidating the associated logical statement. 
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As an example, suppose that from a certain fault symptom one can logically conclude that at 
least one fault among the three faults, labeled by 1F , 2F , and 3F , must be true. Then we have a 
valid conflict among the set of these three faults, conventionally written as 1 2 3, ,F F F  . Notice 
that if one were to pick from the space of all possible conflicts, any conflict with the same three 
faults plus some additional faults, e.g. 1 2 3 4, , ,F FF F  , is also valid as the associated logical 
statement immediately follows. However, 1 2 3 4, , ,F FF F   is not a minimal conflict since one can 
remove 4F  and still retain a valid conflict. 
In summary, each fault symptom provides a logical statement in the form of a conflict. Thus, for 
each abnormal event, a collection of conflicts can be derived from the observed fault symptoms. 
A fault diagnosis is valid if it is consistent with every observed conflict. By logical inference, 
one can then obtain all valid fault diagnoses for the abnormal event.  
Alternatively, in the language of set theory, given the set of all minimal conflicts derived from 
the observed fault symptoms, the list of all minimal diagnoses can be obtained using the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2-1. Let   denote the set of all minimal conflicts in a system, a diagnosis )(  
is a valid minimal diagnosis if and only if its set of faults   is a minimal set to have a non-
empty intersection with the set of faults expressed by every conflict in  : 
 : )(,f f fC C C      (2.3) 
  being a minimal implies that no proper subset of   satisfies the same condition. 
 
To summarize, if the logical implication from each fault symptom is known, the model-based 
diagnosis framework formulated in this section provides an algorithm to obtain all valid minimal 
diagnoses without the need to construct the fault signatures for all possible combination of faults.  
The algorithm consists of the following steps: 
1) Search for inconsistencies between observed data and fault-free system model. Each 
inconsistency serves as a fault symptom, which gives rise to a conflict. 
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2) Obtain a set of minimal conflicts from the observed fault symptoms. 
3) Search for all minimal diagnoses from the set of minimal conflicts, using the proposition 
given by Eqn. (2.3). 
Up until now, we have not discussed how component models and subsequently fault symptoms 
can be constructed. For the original applications of MBD in electronic circuits, component 
models are usually known as part of the system specifications. For applications in engineering 
systems, however, components models are generally not provided and need to be developed for 
diagnostic purposes. The construction of component models is one of the challenging issues one 
needs to address in order to apply the MBD framework to complex engineering systems. For our 
current application for TH systems, the development of physics-based component models will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3 The Qualitative Approach in PRO-AID 
The idea of qualitative physics based on confluences was introduced by de Kleer and Brown in 
[78]. Intuitively, when we observe the behavior of a physical system, the instantaneous values of 
the process variables are often not of interest. The changing trends of the process variables 
convey most of the information regarding the status of the system. From the qualitative 
understanding of the system, one can make sense of what the observed trends indicate without 
performing any calculations or knowing the exact quantitative details of the system. 
Wei and Reifman [6] applied this concept to the FDD problem of TH systems. More specifically, 
the concept of qualitative physics provided an approach to construct qualitative models for each 
generic type of component in a TH system without the need to know component-specific design 
parameters. Since each generic component in a T-H system is designed to perform a specific 
function of either mass, momentum or energy transfer, faults in the component would result in 
the violation of at least one of the balance equations formulated under normal working 
conditions. The qualitative form of each balance equation serves as a qualitative model for the 
component.  
Each qualitative component model provides several relations between individual variable trends 
at the inlet and outlet of the component and an imbalance indicator, referred to as a Q value. 
Each component fault would lead to changing trends in one or several related Q values and thus, 
changing trends in Q values serve as fault symptoms for the reasoning process in fault diagnosis. 
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Qualitative rules based on the qualitative component models form the knowledge base of PRO-
AID. Using the knowledge base, fault symptoms, i.e. Q trends, can be inferred from observed 
process variable trends and from that possible faults can be deduced by applying the MBD 
reasoning framework. 
2.3.1 Qualitative Physics Based on Confluences 
We will use the square brackets “[ ] ” to denote the qualitative property of a variable, which 
could take three possible values: positive (+), zero (0) or negative (-).The trend of a variable Q  
can be determined by the qualitative value of its differential dQ : 
                                                          [ ]dQ Q    is increasing ( )  
                                                          [ ] 0dQ Q   is unchanging ( )  
                                                          [ ]dQ Q    is decreasing ( )  
Confluence equations are simple qualitative forms of differential equations. For our application, 
we are interested in obtaining the relations between qualitative trends of various T-H variables 
and the imbalance indicators in generic components of the system. The confluence equations in 
that case can be derived from the corresponding conservation equations of either mass, 
momentum or energy.  
To illustrate the transformation of a quantitative equation into qualitative form, consider an 
example given by the following arbitrary equation: 
 Q ax by   (2.4) 
where x  and y  are some variables of interest, say some sensor readings; a  and b  are some 
positive but otherwise unknown parameters; Q  is an indicator that we are interested in and 
cannot measure directly. Again, this is just a hypothetical arbitrary equation which does not 
necessarily represent any actual physical phenomenon.   
Under these conditions, we can only observe the qualitative trends of x  and y  separately and 
not the value of ax by . To transform the equation into the qualitative form, we can simply 
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For the third step, [ ]a dx b dy  is set equal to [ ] [ ]a dx b dy . Such operation is only valid if the 
two terms, a dx  and b dy  have opposite signs. The fourth step immediately follows since both 
a  and b  are assumed to be positive. [ ] [ ] [ ]dQ dx dy   is the qualitative form we want. The 
trend of the imbalance indicator Q  can then be inferred from the trend of the individual variables 
x  and y . 
Notice the loss of information in the third step. The sign [ ]a dx b dy  can always be determined 
if one knows the values of a  and b  but the difference [ ] [ ]a dx b dy  is mathematically ill 
defined. For example, if a dx  and b dy  are both positive, their qualitative difference is 
undetermined: 
 positive positive unknown   
Such loss of information is inevitable in the transformation of an equation from quantitative form 
to qualitative form. The emphasis here is that when applicable, the qualitative form 
[ ] [ ] [ ]dQ dx dy   allows us to infer the trend of the variable Q  even though the exact value of 
the “design parameters” are a  and b  unknown. 
Formally, the set of rules to formulate qualitative equations and manipulate qualitative variables 
are summarized below, as described in [78]: 
1. ][ ][ 00 ] [x   
2. ][0] [ ] [xx   
3. ][ ][ ] [x x   
4. ][ ][ ] [x x    
5. [ ][ ][ ] xxy y  
6. [ ] [ ][ ]y xx y   
Most of these transformation rules are intuitive and straightforward, except for the last rule 
which may cause some loss of information as discussed. 
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 2.3.2 Qualitative Models and the Knowledge Base in PRO-AID 
For PRO-AID, qualitative component models are constructed using confluence equations derived 
from the conservation equations of mass, momentum and energy. Consider, for example, a single 
inlet/outlet component under quasi-static conditions, the mass conservation equation can be 
written as: 
 out in massw w Q   (2.6) 
where inw  and outw  are the inlet and outlet flow rates, assumed to be available by sensor 
readings. massQ  is a source/sink term in the mass balance and will be used as the imbalance 
indicator. For this component under normal working conditions we can expect to have 0massQ  , 
i.e. there is no source or sink of mass. 
Following the transformation rules established in the last section, it is straightforward to obtain 
the following confluence equation from Eqn. (2.6): 
 mass out in ][ [[ ]]dQ d dww   (2.7) 
This serves as a qualitative mass balance model for the component. The trend of the imbalance 
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Changing trends in massQ  serve as fault symptoms  indicating there is a leak in or out of the 
component. 








    (2.9) 
where inP  and outP  are inlet and outlet pressures, respectively; w  is the flow rate through the 
component. k ,  , and A   respectively denote the loss coefficient, fluid density and effective 
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cross-sectional area. k  and A   are component-specific parameters and can be expected to 
remain the same if the component is fault-free. We can lump these parameters into a status 









    (2.10) 
Under normal working conditions we can expect to have mom const.Q  Using the transformation 
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   
 (2.11) 
This qualitative equation serves as a qualitative momentum model, from which we can construct 
reasoning rules to infer the trend of momQ  for the component. For instance: 
 in out momIf  and  and  then w P P Q     (2.12) 
momQ  decreasing would serve as a fault symptom indicating a blockage-type fault, i.e. increased 
loss coefficient, in the component. 
This procedure of constructing qualitative models can be generalized for each generic component 
type in TH systems. The reasoning rules defined using such qualitative models form the 
knowledge base for PRO-AID. The knowledge base allows the code to infer changing trends of 
various Q  values from individual process variable trends. Changing trends of the Q  values 
serve as fault symptoms and the logical MBD framework as described in Section 2.2 can be 
applied to obtain possible diagnoses by logical inference. 
2.3.3 Limitations of the Qualitative Reasoning Approach in PRO-AID 
The main advantage of the qualitative approach in PRO-AID is that qualitative models can be 
constructed for each type of generic component in a TH system without the need to know 
component-specific design parameters. The approach was applied successfully in detection of 
abrupt faults in various systems [79, 80, 81]. However, the applicability of this qualitative 
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approach in detecting long-time scale slow degradations is subject to several limitations. 
Furthermore, its capability to deal with sensor faults is limited.  
The limitations in PRO-AID are intrinsic to the qualitative approach. The qualitative model 
developed for each component as a specific set of if-then rules which does not account for the 
possibility of sensor faults generally cannot handle multiple-fault events. The approach requires 
continuous sensor readings to be transformed into discrete qualitative values, which limits the 
detection sensitivity. Faults need to be severe enough to trigger the reasoning rules within a 
relatively short timeframe before feedback and control action responses obscure the underlying 
variable trends. Some loss of information is inevitable when a quantitative equation is 
transformed into qualitative form, which could lead to scenarios where no reasoning rule is 
applicable. The issue is even more significant if number of qualitative variables involved in a 
confluence equation is high in which case the effectiveness of the approach is very limited.  
For the current application, the need for detection of slow degradations in both system 
components and sensors motivates the search for an alternative quantitative approach. 
2.4 Quantitative Model-Based Diagnosis Frameworks 
Quantitative models can be constructed to either describe the normal fault-free behavior of a 
system or to provide a description of its different fault modes. For a consistency-based fault 
diagnosis approach, we need models of the fault-free behavior to check for inconsistencies in the 
observed data. The construction of fault-free quantitative models and their usage in fault 
diagnosis are the focus of this section. 
We will first discuss the reasoning process in quantitative approaches, assuming that quantitative 
models and subsequently model residuals can be constructed for each component in a system. 
Furthermore, model residuals are constructed in a way that would allow us to infer which faults 
are implicated when a residual is non-zero. Various model construction and residual generation 
approaches are then discussed in Section 2.4.2 and explored more in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.4.1 Quantitative Reasoning Frameworks 
From the formulation in Section 2.2, the key step in the MBD framework as a consistency-based 
approach is to identify the set of all minimal conflicts. Conflicts can be derived from 
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discrepancies between the observations and the fault-free system, defined as fault symptoms. The 
constraints between observations and the expected fault-free behavior are formally defined as 
analytical redundancy relations (ARRs). Each analytical redundancy relation provides an 
equation governing the relation between certain observations and components in the system. All 
the ARR equations must hold when the system is fault-free. 
In a quantitative approach, analytical redundancy relations can be expressed by quantitative 
equations. If a certain ARR equation does not hold then at least one of the involved components 
or sensors must be faulty and the degree to which the relation is violated is quantified by a 
residual, defined as the difference between the two sides of the ARR equation. Thus, each non-
zero residual from each independent ARR equation serves as a fault symptom from which a 
minimal conflict can be derived.  
Following the formulation in Section 2.2, the MBD framework for the quantitative approach can 
be summarized in three main steps as listed in Table 2-1.  
Table 2-1. The MBD framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis 
Step 1 
Identify available ARRs from component models, from which 
define possible residuals. 
Step 2 Obtain minimal conflicts from non-zero residuals 
Step 3 
Obtain all valid minimal diagnoses from the set of all minimal 
conflicts. 
 
The MBD framework as introduced above was originally developed in the computer science and 
artificial intelligence community [72, 82]. An independent but closely related framework was 
developed in parallel by the fault detection and isolation (FDI) community [82]. We will refer to 
this alternative approach as the FDI framework just to distinguish it from the former although 
both serve as a framework for model-based diagnosis. 
The two frameworks are analogous in the sense that both are consistency-based and rely on 
system models and the same redundancy information for consistency-checking. More 
specifically for both frameworks in the context of a quantitative approach, the occurrence of a 
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fault is detected by non-zero residuals indicating discrepancies between the observed behavior 
and the normal operation behavior described by the system model. The distinction is on how 
diagnoses are obtained from the observed residuals. 
As described above, in the MBD framework, only non-zero residuals are used as fault symptoms 
to formulate the required minimal conflicts while zero residuals are ignored. In the FDI 
framework, a significant but commonly employed assumption is the notion of exoneration using 
zero residuals. In addition to the fact that non-zero residuals indicate possible faults, it is often 
assumed zero residuals indicate ‘no-faults’, thus all relevant faults in the involved components 
and sensors are exonerated [72, 67].  
The notion of exoneration is an approximation and not mathematically exact. It is possible that 
multiple faults can occur simultaneously and compensate one another to give a zero residual. In 
such scenario, the invalid exonerations may lead to false diagnoses. However, for most cases in 
practice, such scenarios can be considered statistically insignificant. The notion of exoneration 
can help simplify the reasoning process and provide more detailed diagnoses.  
Using the notion of exoneration, relevant faults from zero residuals can be removed from the 
observed conflicts. The reasoning process for fault diagnosis in the FDI framework is 
summarized in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2. The FDI framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis 
Step 1 
Identify available ARRs from component models, from which 
define possible residuals. 
Step 2 Obtain minimal conflicts from non-zero residuals 
Step 3 Use zero residuals to exonerate relevant faults from the conflicts 
Step 4 Obtain all valid diagnoses from the reduced conflicts. 
 
So far, we have assumed that all component models are known and there is no uncertainty in the 
model predictions or observed data. That is not the case for most applications in engineering 
systems. Modeling uncertainty is inevitable, and all observations are subject to noise and 
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measurement uncertainty. The effects of modeling and measurement uncertainty add another 
layer of complications one needs to account for.  
In the next chapter, we will discuss the development of component models in TH systems of 
nuclear power plants. As dictated by the underlying physics, the models for most components in 
the thermal-hydraulic systems are non-linear, even in steady-state operation. A crucial part of the 
model development process is to account for the possibility that the plant may undergo various 
controlled changes in operating conditions and the validity of the component models should be 
insensitive to such changes.  
2.4.2 Model Construction and Residual Generation Approaches 
Generally, quantitative models of technical processes in engineering systems can either be 
derived analytically from understanding of the underlying physics or constructed empirically as 
black-box models using past data. In practice, the two approaches may be combined to create 
gray-box models using both physical laws and operational data [17].  
The dynamics of a technical process in a system can be characterized by its response outputs 
( )ty  to inputs ( )tu , where ( )ty  and ( )tu  are column vectors. For linear time-invariant (LTI) 
systems, the response is more conveniently expressed by an input-output model under Laplace 
transform: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )us G s sy u  (2.13) 
where ( )uG s  is known as the transfer matrix; the label s  denotes the complex variable of 
Laplace transform. For any time-dependent function ( )f t , Laplace transform is a generalization 
of Fourier transform to express the function in frequency domain, defined by: 
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where s  is a complex variable with s i    for a weighting constant   and frequency 
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Thus, to model the system, one must either obtained the transfer matrix ( )uG s  either analytically 
or empirically. Both the inputs ( )tu  and outputs ( )ty  are assumed to be measurable. At any 
given time t , the state of the system can defined by a set of unmeasurable state variables ( )tx . 
The model of the LTI system can be expressed in the state-space representation as: 
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where A , B , C  and D  are parameter matrices. The state-space model (2.16) can be obtained 
directly by modeling or derived from the minimum state-space realization of the transfer matrix 
( )uG s  using the relation  
1
( )u BG s D C sI A
    [67]. 
In general, the fault-free behavior of a dynamic LTI system can be described by either an input-
output model or a state-space model. Given the fault-free model, one can then generate model 
residuals for fault diagnosis. Ideally, we want the residuals to be mostly sensitive to the effects of 
various faults and insensitive to noise and model uncertainty. A straightforward approach to 
residual generation is to use the difference between the measured outputs ( )sy  and fault-free 
model prediction ˆ ( )sy : 
 ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )us s s s G s s   r y y y u  (2.17) 
However, in the presence of model uncertainty and possible sources of noise and disturbances, 
the performance of such residual generator is often poor [67]. In the effort of reducing the 
sensitivity to noise and model uncertainty, residuals are defined as functions of the measured 
inputs and outputs using filter and factorization techniques. Ding and Frank introduced the 
following form for residuals of LTI systems [67]: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u us R s M s s N s s r y u  (2.18) 
where ( )R s  is a parametrization matrix, and: 
 1( ) ( )uM s I C sI A LC L
     (2.19) 
 29
 1( ) ( ) ( )uN s D C sI A LC B LD
      (2.20) 
for a matrix L  known as the observer gain matrix. The forms of ( )R s  and L  depend on the 
particular residual generator chosen for a system. Residual generation methods for LTI systems 
include: fault detection filter [65, 66], diagnostic observer [67, 13], parity space [68, 17, 67]. 
In the above analysis, the time variable is continuous. For discrete time, the Laplace transform is 
replaced by z-transform and the analyses hold with s  replaced by the variable z  of the z-
transform. It should be noted that in general, the effects of different faults may combine in the 
residual vector ( )sr . Thus, additional techniques in analyzing the residuals are needed to 
differentiate between different faults in a system. 
In practice, most technical processes are non-linear, and it is generally not possible to 
analytically model non-linear dynamic processes. Linear assumptions or linearization techniques 
are required to represent such systems by linear input-output or state-space models. For instance, 
the behavior of each non-linear system in operating conditions close to a reference point can be 
approximated by a linear model. Alternatively, data-driven methods can be used to directly 
construct the relation between input and output variables, provided that a large set of operational 
data is available. Data-driven methods to construct quantitative models include principle 
component analysis (PCA), artificial neural network (ANN) [23]. 
Besides input-output and state-space models, one can also construct models to express certain 
process parameters ( )t  as functions of both the input and output variables. The parameters ( )t  
are in turn related to other physical parameters and variables relevant to different faults in the 
system. Using the models for ( )t , one can generate different residuals relevant to various faults 
in the system. Such approach to residual generation is known as the parameter estimation 
approach [69, 17]. 
For the current application in this thesis, we will use a physics-based approach to construct 
models for each performance-related parameter in a component and generate model residuals via 
the parameter estimation approach. The approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Considering the characteristics of the diagnostic problem and the objectives for the target 
application, the quantitative model-based approach was selected as the basis for the fault 
detection and diagnosis framework in this thesis. The key factors that shaped the development of 
the proposed FDD approach include the need for sufficiently high detection sensitivity to detect 
faults of slow degradation type, the capability to simultaneously deal with both component faults 
and sensors faults, and the desired insensitivity to various sources of uncertainty and possible 
changes in operating conditions. 
The proposed theoretical framework consists of a quantitative model-based approach to quantify 
slow performance degradations and uncertainty treatments, including statistical change detection 
and probabilistic reasoning, to robustly deal with modeling uncertainty and measurement error. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, developing component models adequate for diagnostic purpose is one 
of the challenging issues one needs to address in order to apply the model-based diagnosis 
frameworks to complex engineering systems.  
There are generally two approaches to constructing quantitative component models, namely data-
driven approach and physics-based approach. For the data-driven approach, each component 
model is constructed by machine learning techniques relying solely on a set of data describing 
past behavior of the component. As such, the quality of the model depends on the coverage of 
the data set used as training data and the capability to extrapolate is limited. In applications for 
nuclear power plants, the data available are often not ideal for purely data-driven approaches. 
The physics-based approach, on the other hand, relies on understanding of the underlying 
physics to formulate the functional form of the component model with only a few parameters left 
to be determined for each specific component. The quality of physics-based models is less data-
Chapter 3  
Physics-based Component Models 
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dependent and generally one can expect the physics-based approach to be less sensitive to 
changes in operation conditions. The physics-based approach for model construction is preferred 
for the framework developed in this thesis. 
3.1 Physics-based Model Construction 
In this section, we will discuss the physics-based approach to construct quantitative models for 
the model-based diagnosis frameworks. Although some of the component-specific design 
parameters may be available, it is often not practical to use them directly in deriving analytical 
models to describe the underlying physics. Constructing models solely from geometric design 
parameters often requires computational simulations and cannot be done analytically. The 
general approach proposed here is to construct parametric models to describe the behavior of the 
component by simplifying the underlying physics. Effectively, all geometric characteristics of 
the component are lumped into a few unknown parameters of the parametric models. The 
unknown model parameters are to be determined using past data. 
Each TH system in a nuclear power plant can be decomposed into separate components of 
known generic types, e.g. valve, pump, heat exchanger. Each component of a generic type is 
designed to perform a basic function of either mass, momentum or energy transfer. The behavior 
or performance of a component in normal working conditions can be described by separate 
models constructed for each of these three processes.  
A fault is defined to be any change in the characteristics of a component that affect its ability to 
perform its designed function. Any fault or malfunction in the component would alter its 
characteristic which will be reflected by an inconsistency between the actual observed behaviors 
and a model prediction. More specifically, since the models for each component are constructed 
based on the three conservation equations, any fault in the component would result in an 
unaccounted imbalance in at least one of the conservation equations which leads to a non-zero 
residual for the corresponding model. For the current application, we are considering faults of the 
slow degradation type in the long-time scale during which the operation of each component can 
be considered quasi-static. 
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To clarify, consider a one-dimensional incompressible flow through a single inlet/outlet 
component. The integral equations for the conservation of mass, momentum and energy for the 
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 (3.2) 
 in in out out eng
d
H w h w h Q
dt
    (3.3) 
where the indices ‘in’ and ‘out’ denote the inlet and outlet location; m is the total fluid mass 
enclosed in the control volume; w  denotes the mass flow rate; P  denotes pressure; A  denotes 
cross-sectional area;  Tl A  is the equivalent inertia length for the component defined by its 
geometric dimensions;   is the fluid density; g  is the gravitational acceleration constant; z  
denotes the relative elevation at each location of the flow; lossP  denotes the total pressure loss; 
H  denotes the total energy enclosed in the control volume; h  denotes the specific enthalpy and 
engQ  is the combined energy source/sink term. 
By assuming quasi-static conditions, we are setting the time derivative terms, i.e. the left sides of 
Eqns. (3.1-3.3) to zero. Explicitly, we are assuming that even though the TH process variables at 
the inlet and outlet of each component may vary over time, the contribution of the time 
derivatives to the conservation equations are negligible. 
In general, for each component, one can construct three models to describe its fault-free behavior 
with regard to the conservation of mass, momentum and energy. For brevity, we will refer to 
these models for each component as the mass, momentum and energy models. As discussed, we 
will formulate physics-based parametric models for each generic type of generic component with 
a few component-specific parameters left to be determined using past data. 
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3.1.1 Mass Models 
Using Eqn. (3.1) and setting the derivative term to zero, we obtain a simple relation enforcing the 
balance of mass flow rates between the inlet and outlet. This serves as a mass model for the 
component with no unknown parameters involved. For a generic component with multiple inlet 
or outlet, the mass model is given by: 
 in outw w   (3.4) 
To evaluate the performance of a component regarding the mass model, a full set of flowrate 
sensors at every inlet and outlet location is required. 
3.1.2 Momentum Models  
Setting the left side to zero and rearranging the terms in Eqn. (3.2), we have: 
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        
 
 (3.5) 
This relation is valid for single-phase incompressible flows in components with no source of 
momentum, i.e. not a pump. The first term is the gravity effect which is fixed for each 
component. The second term, account for the acceleration of the fluid, vanishes if the cross-
sectional areas at the inlet and outlet are the same. The total pressure loss lossP  can be further 
decomposed into pressure losses due to friction ( frictionP )  and form losses ( formP ) due to any 
abrupt changes of flow direction or geometry.  
Generally, for incompressible flow, the form loss term formP  is proportional to the square of the 










  (3.6) 
where f  is the frictional pressure drop coefficient, L  is the length of the flow channel, eD  the 
equivalent diameter and mv  is the bulk velocity of the flow. The pressure drop coefficient f  is 
usually given as function of the Reynolds number Re , with: 
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 Re m e
v D

  (3.7) 
where   is the viscosity of the fluid. The exact form of f  depends on the flow regime, 
identified by the magnitude of Re , and other characteristics of the flow surface. For example, 




f   (3.8) 
Or for turbulent flow inside a smooth tube using the McAdams correlation with 4 610 Re 10   
[83]: 
 0.200.184Ref   (3.9) 
Notice that the bulk velocity mv  is generally proportional to the flow rate. Thus, the right side of 
Eqn. (3.5) only depends on a single process variable, the flow rate w . All other parameters are 
either constant or are geometric characteristics of the component which should remain the same 
if the component is fault-free. The dependence of fluid properties on slight change of pressure or 
temperature can be neglected. 
Therefore, to monitor the performance of the component regarding the conservation of 
momentum, we need to construct a parametric model for the pressure difference between the 
inlet and outlet as a function of the flow rate: 
 in out ( )P P f w   (3.10) 
The parametric form of the function ( )f w  is to be determined. Expressed as a polynomial of w , 
it can have a zero-order term from the gravity effect, a second-order term from the form losses 
term ( formP ). The friction loss contribution can be lumped into a term of order between first and 
second order, depending on the flow regime. Overall, it suffices to use a quadratic form for the 
parametric function ( )f w . Thus, the momentum model for a generic component with 
incompressible fluid is given by: 
 2in out 0 1 2P P ww      (3.11) 
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where 0 , 1 , and 2  are the three unknown model parameters to be determined for each specific 
component using sensor data in a calibration process. Effectively, the geometric and design 
characteristics of the component are lumped into these three model parameters. Any momentum-
related faults, e.g. leakage or blockage, would result the change of at least one parameter.  
The calibration and subsequent use of this momentum model requires reading data from three 
sensors: inlet pressure inP , outlet pressure outP  and flowrate w  at either the inlet or outlet. 
For pumps, we have an additional term for momentum gain ( gainP ) to Eqn. (3.5) due to the 
pump motor shaft power. In general, gainP  may depend on not only the flow rate but also pump 
speed and other operating conditions. Momentum model for pumps, if not provided, need to be 
developed for each specific design type. For a simple constant speed pump, we can use a model 
similar to Eqn. (3.11) with the inlet and outlet pressure interchanged to quantify the pump head: 
 2head out in 0 1 2wPP P w        (3.12) 
3.1.3 Energy Models 
The quasi-static conservation of energy equation for a generic component is given by Eqn. (3.3) 
with the left side set to zero: 
 out out in in engw h w h Q   (3.13) 
The energy source term engQ  is component- and situation-dependent.  Thus, to model the 
component behavior in energy-related process, we need a model for engQ  in terms of other 
process variables. 
For a pump, engQ  is the effective shaft power provided by the pump motor which will be 
modeled as a function of the flowrate and pump speed. For other non-heat-exchanging 
components, engQ  is a small loss term, including external heat loss, which is often not of interest 
and can be neglected. For heat exchangers, e.g. heaters or condensers, engQ  depends on the 
component type and operating conditions. In general, we only need to construct energy models 
for heat-exchanging components with the parametric forms depend on the component type. 
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As an example, consider the case of a single-phase counterflow shell-tube heat exchanger. 
Following the above analysis, the heat exchanger is a composite of two single inlet/outlet 
components, one for each side. The loss term engQ  from the hot side is approximately the gain 
term engQ  for the cold side. Thus, it is more convenient to model both sides together.  
Assuming negligible external heat loss, the total heat transfer rate is related to the inlet and outlet 
enthalpies on each side by: 
 eng in out out in( ) ( )
h h h c c cQ w h h w h h     (3.14) 
where the superscripts h  and c  denote the hot side and cold side of the heat exchanger, 
respectively. Each enthalpy value can be obtained from the corresponding temperature sensor 
given the operating pressure. 
This is the heat balance equation that holds when there is no leakage or significant external heat 
loss in the heat exchanger. Besides the heat balance, we are more interested in monitoring the 
heat-exchanging capability of the heat exchanger. Faults related to the heat-exchanging 
capability, like fouling, would not affect the heat balance. Briefly, fouling in a heat exchanger is 
the accumulation of unwanted materials on the heat-exchanging surfaces which may affect both 
the heat transfer process as well as the momentum transfer along the axial direction. 
To monitor the heat-exchanging capability, the overall heat transfer coefficient is defined via the 















  (3.15) 
where out in
h c
o TT T   and in out
h c
i TT T    are the temperature differences between the two sides 
at the outlet and inlet of the hot side. U  is defined to be the overall heat transfer coefficient and 
A  is the effective heat transfer area. 
As A  can be considered a constant for each heat exchanger, we can combined U  and A  into a 
single parameter UA  which can be used to monitor the heat transfer performance of the heat 
exchanger. For brevity, we will also refer to UA  as the overall heat transfer coefficient.  
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For the exchanger, even in fault-free state, UA  is not a constant but depends on other process 
variables. The problem of constructing a model for the heat transfer process reduces to 
constructing a model for UA . At each axial location, the local heat transfer coefficient of the 
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where id   and od  are the inner and outer tube diameters; hh   and ch  are the film heat transfer 
coefficients for the hot side and cold side, respectively; wR  is the heat resistance by the tube wall 
per unit area on the inner side. The film heat transfer coefficient on each side can be expressed in 






  (3.17) 
where fk   is the fluid conductivity and the hydraulic diameter hD   for each side is used as the 
characteristic length. 
To obtain a parametric model for UA  as a function of the process variables at the inlet and outlet 
of the heat exchanger, we first need an expression for iU . For that purpose, we need to 
investigate the functional form of the heat transfer coefficients hh   and ch , which in general 
depend on the fluid properties, heat exchanging surface conditions and flow conditions. For 
instance, for fully developed turbulent flow of nonmetallic fluids, the Nusselt number is given by 
a generic expression [83]: 








where w  is the fluid viscosity at wall temperature;   is the fluid viscosity at bulk temperature; 
C ,  ,  , and   are constants that depend on the fluid properties and geometry of the flow 
channel; and Pr  is the Prandtl number of the fluid. 
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For single-phase water with w  , the Dittus-Boelter correlation is commonly used [83, 84]: 
 0.80.023Re PrnNu   (3.19) 
with 0.3n    for cooling and 0.4n    for heating. 
Notice that for each side of the heat exchanger, the Reynolds number Re  is proportional to the 
flow rate w  hence in this case using Eqn. (3.19) the Nusselt number Nu  is proportional to a 
power of the mass flowrate, 0.8w . If the dependence of other fluid properties on slight changes of 
on temperature can be considered negligible, we have the following expression for the local heat 
transfer coefficient iU  under changes of flow rate on each side: 
 0.8 0.80 0 0
0 0
1 1 1( ) ( )h c w





    (3.20) 
where the subscript 0 the values evaluated at a reference operating point.  
Note that the overall heat transfer coefficient U  as defined by Eqn. (3.15) is a weighted average 
of the local iU  along the axial direction. Thus, using the expression for iU , we can obtain a 
parametric model for UA  that explicitly only depends on the two flowrates hw  and cw : 
 0.8 0.8 0
1
h h c cw wUA
       (3.21) 
with three model parameters h ,  c  and 0  to be determined in the calibration process. 
Physically, these three parameters encode the fluid properties and geometric characteristics of 
the heat exchanger. Heat-exchanging-related faults would cause the heat exchanger to deviate 
from this expected model. 
In practice, the flow characteristic on the shell side is not the same as the tube side. For instance, 
in the presence of the baffles on the shell side (usually the cold side), a better approximation is to 
adjust the power of the flow rate term from 0.8  to 0.6  [85]. Thus, for a heat exchanger with 
the baffles in the cold shell side, the parametric model for UA  becomes: 
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 0.8 0.6 0
1
h h c cw wUA
       (3.22) 
In practice, an extra correction factor, to account for the temperature profile along the axial 
direction especially for the case with multiple shell or tube passes, is often included in the 
definition of UA  in Eqn. (3.15) [85]. For the current application as we only consider small 
deviations around a steady state operating point, the variation of such correction factor due to 
changes in temperature is assumed to be negligible. 
To summarize, the energy model for a single-phase counterflow shell-tube heat exchanger 
include the heat balance given by Eqn. (3.14), the overall heat transfer coefficient UA  computed 
using the LMTD model in Eqn. (3.15) and a parametric model for UA  in terms of the two flow 
rates given by Eqn. (3.21) or (3.22). The parametric model for UA  has three unknown model 
parameters left to be determined for each specific heat exchanger by using measurement data. 
Monitoring both the heat balance and the heat transfer performance via UA  requires six sensors 
at the inlet and outlet of the heat exchanger: the flow rate, inlet and outlet temperatures on each 
side. If the heat balance can be ensured by other means, the construction of the parametric model 
for UA  requires five of the six sensors. In that case the sixth sensor can be computed from the 
other five using the heat balance equation. 
In this section, we have discussed the approach to construct physics-based models for 
components in TH systems. Only some of the most common components have been discussed. 
The procedure will be generalized to apply for a larger class of components of each design type. 
Each parametric model for a component in general may contain several model parameters. These 
parameters are to be determined for each specific component by fitting the model against 
measurement data in a process referred to as model calibration. Depending on the parametric 
form of the model, model calibration can be performed using linear or polynomial regression 
[86]. Details on the relevant regression methods will be provided in Appendix A. 
3.2 Residual Generation 
After quantitative models have been constructed for all possible components in a system, the 
next step is to obtain all available analytical redundancy relations from each model. Each ARR 
can be used to generate one residual whose non-zero value serves as a fault symptom in 
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quantitative model-based diagnosis as discussed in Section 2.4. From Section 3.1, the physics-
based models for each component are constructed separately for each of the mass, momentum 
and energy processes. As such, ARRs from each model will only be sensitive to specific type of 
faults. We have developed component models and subsequently model residuals in a way that 
would allow us to differentiate between different types of faults in a component. 
By definition, each ARR must remain valid even under changes of boundary or operating 
conditions if the related components and sensors are fault-free. As an example, for a single-phase 
heat exchanger, the overall heat transfer coefficient UA  is a performance-related parameter but it 
may not stay the same under changes in operating conditions.  Thus, setting UA  to a reference 
value does not produce a valid ARR. Fouling in the heat exchanger would affect UA  but so do 
possible changes in operating conditions like the flow rate on either side. An ARR to detect 
fouling must be obtained from a model that can account for the possible changes of operating 
conditions.  
Residuals from Mass Models 
The mass balance model for a generic component does not contain any model parameters. For 
each mass model, we have a single ARR enforcing the flow rate balance between the inlets and 
outlets the residual can be computed as: 
 mass in outr w w    (3.23) 
The calculation of massr  involves a set of flow rate sensors, one for each inlet or outlet. A non-
zero value for massr  would indicate either a sensor fault or a leakage in or out of the component. 
Residuals from Momentum Models 
For a generic momentum model given by Eqn. (3.11), we have a single ARR relating the 
measured pressure loss provided by the two pressure readings and the model pressure loss model 
prediction. The residual from that ARR can be computed as: 
    2press in out 0 1 2r P P ww      (3.24) 
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The calculation of pressr  requires three sensor readings for inP , outP  and w . A non-zero value for 
pressr  would indicate either one of the sensor faults or a blockage or leakage in the component. 
Residuals from Energy Models 
Consider energy model for the heat exchanger described in 3.1.3 which includes a heat balance 
equation and a parametric model for UA , we have two independent ARRs: 
 in out out in( ) ( ) ( )Heat Balance
h h h c c cw h h w h h    (3.25) 
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
 (3.26) 
Each of these ARRs involves six sensors: a flow rate sensor, inlet temperature and outlet 
temperature for each side. For a given operating pressure on each side, the enthalpy values can 
be obtained directly from temperature sensor readings.  
If all six sensors are available, we can straightforwardly compute the following two residuals: 
 in out out in( ) ( )
h h h c c c
Lr w h h w h h     (3.27) 
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
 (3.28) 
Note that for each side of the heat exchanger, the flow rate could be measured at either the inlet 
or outlet. A leakage causing a loss of mass would violate both ARRs and cause both residuals to 
be non-zero. The calculation of each residual involves six sensors. In general, a non-zero Lr
would indicate a leakage or one of the sensor faults. A non-zero 0r  would indicate either leakage, 
fouling or one of the sensor faults. 
To detect and differentiate sensor faults, we can combine the two ARRs and compute one 
residual without using one of the sensors. That is, when all six sensors are available, we have the 
option to leave out one sensor. Using the other five sensors and assuming the first ARR holds, 
we can estimate the sixth sensor and use the result with the second ARR to generate a new 
residual. That way, we can have up to six residuals using each combination of five sensors. Each 
residual serves as a possible fault symptom and as discussed in Chapter 2, we would like to 
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maximize the number of fault symptoms in order to improve the resolution of the diagnostic 
result.  
If only five sensors are available, we cannot enforce the two ARRs. In this case, one must rely on 
other methods to detect possible leakage in the heat exchanger. Then assuming no leakage, the 
heat balance equation can be used to estimate the missing sixth sensor. The result can be used 
with the second ARR to generate one residual. 
3.3 Example – Fault Diagnosis of a Single-phase Heat Exchanger 
After all residuals have been constructed from the component models, one can apply one of the 
two frameworks listed in Table 2-1 and 2-2 to perform fault diagnosis. 
To demonstrate this process, consider an example with the single-phase counterflow heat 
exchanger described in Section 3.1 and 3.2. We will assume six sensors are available. Let iS   
with 1,2,...6i   to denote the sensors for the flow rate, inlet temperature, outlet temperature of 
the cold side and then those for the hot side, respectively. 
We will consider both component faults and sensor faults: 
 Component faults: leakage (denoted by LF  ) and fouling ( 0F ) 
 Sensors faults: fault in sensor iS  , denoted by iF  for 1,2,...6i   
 
A leakage fault is the loss of mass from tube side to the shell side or the shell side to the external 
environment. Fouling is the accumulation of unwanted materials on the tube inner and outer 
surfaces affecting both the heat transfer process between the tube and shell sides as well as the 
momentum transfer along the axial direction. A sensor is said to be out of calibration if there is a 
significant bias between its reading value and the true value. 
Since we only have a flow rate sensor for each side of the heat exchanger, it is possible to 
construct any mass or momentum model. We can only construct the energy model as described 
in 3.1.3. It follows that we can construct eight residuals in total. One from the heat balance 
relation given by Eqn. (3.27), a second residual from the HX performance relation given by Eqn. 
(3.28), and the other six residuals by combining the two ARRs and use each combination of five 
sensors, leaving out one sensor. 
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For instance, without using the sensor for the cold side inlet temperature, i.e. sensor 2S , the 
value for that variable can be estimated from the heat balance equation: 
 in in,p out in out( ) ( )
h
c c c h h
c
w
h T h h h
w
    (3.29) 
where the subscript ‘p’ indicates that the temperature in,p
cT  is to be predicted from the compute 
enthalpy in
ch . Using in,p
cT  with the second ARRs, we can compute a residual, denoted by 2r : 
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 (3.30) 
The subscript ‘2’ in 2r  is to emphasize that this residual is computed without using sensor 2S . 
Similarly, we have six residuals, denoted by ir  for 1,2,...6i  , each computed without using 
sensor iS . 
Overall, this system has eight independent faults, denoted by LF  , 0F , …, 6F  and we have 
constructed eight  different eight residuals Lr , 0r ,…, 6r . The dependencies of each residual are 
summarized in Table 3-1. 





Lr  Leakage 1S , 2S , 3S , 4S , 5S , 6S  
0r  Leakage, Fouling 1S , 2S , 3S , 4S , 5S , 6S  
1r  Leakage, Fouling        2S , 3S , 4S , 5S , 6S  
2r  Leakage, Fouling 1S ,        3S , 4S , 5S , 6S  
3r  Leakage, Fouling 1S , 2S ,        4S , 5S , 6S  
4r  Leakage, Fouling 1S , 2S , 3S ,        5S , 6S  
5r  Leakage, Fouling 1S , 2S , 3S , 4S ,        6S  
6r  Leakage, Fouling 1S , 2S , 3S , 4S , 5S  
  
The calculation of each residual involves a certain number of sensors as listed in the third 
column. For each residual, the relevant components faults are those that can affect the underlying 
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analytical redundancy relation and cause the residual to become non-zero. With the structure of 
each residual known, one can then apply a quantitative model-based diagnosis framework to 
obtain possible diagnoses for a given set of fault symptoms. 
As mentioned in Section 2, we will use a short-handed notation to write diagnoses and conflicts: 
 Each diagnosis is denoted by the square brackets “[] ” containing a list of faults. For 
example, 0 3[ , ]F F  is a diagnosis claiming both 0F  and 3F  must be true. 
 Each conflict relation is denoted by the angle brackets “  ” containing a list of faults. For 
instance, 0 3,F F   is a conflict relation claiming that either 3F  or 3F  must be true. 
3.3.1 Fault Diagnosis Using the MBD Framework 
Consider a scenario in which all residuals are observed to be non-zero, except for 3r . The set of 
residual values can be written in a column vector as (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T , with each index list the 
value for a residual in the order of appearance in Table 3-1. The binary value 1 indicates a 
residual is non-zero. 
We will now apply the MBD framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis, as detailed in 
Table 2-1. Step 1 has already been done. The next step is to obtain a conflict from each non-zero 
residual. The logical basis to construct a conflict is the claim: if a residual is non-zero then either 
the component is faulty with a fault of the specified relevant types or one of the involved sensors 
is faulty. Thus, using the structure of the residuals listed in Table 3-1, we can construct the 
following seven minimal conflicts from the seven non-zero residuals: 
Table 3-2. Minimal conflicts for a scenario with residuals (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T  
Symptom Minimal conflict 
0Lr   61 2 3 4 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
0 0r   0 1 2 63 4 5, , , , , , ,L F F F F FF F F   
1 0r   60 2 3 4 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
2 0r   3 4 5 60 1, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
4 0r   60 1 2 3 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
5 0r   60 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
6 0r   50 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   
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Thus, we have a set of seven minimal conflicts. Each conflict is the logical statement claiming 
one of the faults as listed must be true. Following the logical framework, a diagnosis is valid if 
and only if it can simultaneously satisfy all these seven logical statements. 
Using the proposition given by Eqn. (2.3), we can search for all valid minimal diagnoses ( )  
under the condition that   is a minimal set with at least one element from the set of faults in 
each conflict. In this case, the list of all valid minimal diagnoses  can be found to be: 
 3 3[ ,] ] or [ ] or [  for any , ,L i jF iFF j LF   (3.31) 
As shown in Table 3-2, LF  and 3F  are two common elements for all seven conflicts. It follows 
that [ ]LF  and 3[ ]F  are two valid single-fault minimal diagnoses. Any combination of two or 
more faults is also a valid diagnosis but since we are considering only minimal diagnoses, the 
other possibilities are limited to two-fault diagnoses [ , ]i jF F  for the indices  , ,3i j L . All other 
possibilities are either not valid or not minimal. 
Therefore, in this scenario the diagnostic result contains two single-fault diagnoses ( [ ]LF , 3[ ]F ) 
and 15 two-fault diagnoses ([ , ]i jF F  with 3, ,i j L ). Mathematically, all these 17 diagnoses are 
equally valid. The only way one can narrow the list down further is by considering the prior 
probability of each fault. For instance, if all eight faults can be assumed to be equally likely with 
a small probability, then multiple-fault events can be considered significantly less likely than 
single-fault events. In that case, one can consider the single-fault assumption and eliminate all 
multiple-fault diagnoses. 
In this framework, non-zero residuals are used to construct conflicts while zero residuals are not 
utilized. More specifically, the approach only makes a backward reasoning claim that when a 
residual is non-zero then at least one of the involved components or sensors must be faulty. It 
does not make any assumption in the forward cause-effect direction or any claim on how an 
ARR is affected when a fault occurs. In particular, it does not eliminate the possibility that some 
faults may not be detected by some ARRs in which they are involved. In the context of the 
current example, such possibility means a sensor may involve in the calculation of multiple 
residuals, but a fault in that sensor, depending on the magnitude, may affect only some of those 
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residuals. Without neglecting such possibility, no definite logical statement can be drawn from a 
zero residual. 
Overall, the MDB framework is logically sound and mathematically exact. But since no 
assumption or simplification is made, the diagnostic results in some cases may be too generic. As 
shown for the current example with the residuals observed to be (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T , there are 17 
valid minimal diagnoses one need to consider. 
3.3.2 Fault Diagnosis Using the FDI Framework 
We will now proceed to the FDI framework, following the steps as described in Table 2-2. The 
first two steps are common to the MBD framework. For step 3, zero residuals are used to reduce 
the observed conflicts by the notion of exoneration. 
Consider again the scenario with the residuals observed to be (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T . From the seven 
non-zero residuals, we can obtain seven minimal conflicts as listed in Table 3-2. The residual 
3 0r   allows us to exonerate all of its relevant faults from the seven conflicts. From the structure 
of 3r  listed in Table 3-1, the relevant faults are 21 4 5 60{ }, , , , , ,L F F F F FF F . The process of reducing 
the observed conflicts is summarized in Table 3-3. 
Table 3-3. FDI reasoning process for a scenario with residuals (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T  
Symptom Minimal conflicts Reduced conflicts 
0Lr   61 2 3 4 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
0 0r   0 1 2 63 4 5, , , , , , ,L F F F F FF F F   3F   
1 0r   60 2 3 4 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
2 0r   3 4 5 60 1, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
4 0r   60 1 2 3 5, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
5 0r   60 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
6 0r   50 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,L F F F FF F F   3F   
 
Thus, after exoneration, all conflicts are reduced to 3F   and we are left with only one 
possibility, a fault in sensor 3S . The final diagnostic result in this case is 3[ ]F . 
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It is clear that in this case, the FDI framework produced a more detailed result. That is possible 
because the additional information from zero residuals was utilized by the use of the notion of 
exoneration. Effectively by using the notion of exoneration for all zero residual, the FDI 
framework makes two claims: 
 A fault would result in a non-zero residual for all ARRs it is involved in. 
 Multiple faults do not counteract one another to give a zero residual. 
Both of these claims are only approximations and not mathematically exact. Nevertheless, the 
notion of exoneration allows us to simplify the reasoning process and obtain more detailed 
results.  
The two claims in the notion of exoneration can be combined into a single forward statement that 
if one or more faults relevant to a residual occur then the residual is non-zero. Using such 
statement, one can construct the forward mapping from each set of faults to a set of fault 
symptoms, known as the fault signature as discussed in Section 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
For the current example, the fault signatures for all possible scenarios are listed in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4. Fault signatures for the HX example under the notion of exoneration 





Lr  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0r  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1r  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
2r  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
3r  1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
4r  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
5r  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
6r  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
LF : leakage, 0F : fouling, iF  for 1i   : fault in sensor iS  
1  indicates a non-zero residual, 0  indicates zero residual 
 
Given the fault signature table, fault diagnosis can be done by simply matching the fault 
signatures to the observed set of fault symptoms. For the current example, the observed set of 
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symptoms is (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T  which matches the signature for 3[ ]F . The final diagnostic result is 
3[ ]F , in agreement with the result we have obtained previously by backward inference.  
In this simple example for a single component, we were able to construct the forward mapping 
represented by a fault signature table. All the multiple-fault states were shown to have the same 
signature but that is not the case in general. Again, it should be emphasized that the premise of 
the model-based diagnosis frameworks formulated in Chapter 2 is to perform diagnosis without 
the need to construct the forward mapping as that task may not be practically possible, especially 




The physics-based approach developed in Chapter 3 can be summarized by the following 
flowchart. 
 
Figure 4-1. Model-based diagnosis framework using physics-based component models 
Physics-based parametric models are obtained for each generic type of component from 
simplifying the underlying physics. Each parametric model may contain several model 
parameters which are then determined for each specific component in a calibration process using 
a set of training data. Calibration data can be obtained from the startup data of the system. The 
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calibrated component models provide the source of analytical redundancy relations for fault 
diagnosis. Residuals are computed from each component model using live sensor readings. 
Residuals are then evaluated with each non-zero residual serving as a fault symptom. The 
reasoning process going from fault symptoms to diagnostic results is performed using one of the 
diagnosis frameworks as discussed in Section 2.4. Such reasoning processes were demonstrated 
in Section 3.3 for an example of a single-phase heat exchanger. 
Up until now, we have not considered the effects of noise and uncertainty. In practice, various 
sources of uncertainty could be present in a system and affect most of the steps of the flowchart 
in Figure 4-1. Different approaches to uncertainty treatment in model-based diagnosis are 
discussed in this chapter. 
4.1 Uncertainty Sources and Effects 
The two main sources of uncertainty in the current diagnostic problem are measurement 
uncertainty and modeling uncertainty. Measurement uncertainty, present in both the calibration 
data and live sensor data, originates from the uncertainty in the reading value of each sensor. 
Modeling uncertainty comes from both the parametric form for each model and the calibration 
process. Parametric models are obtained by simplifying the underlying physics and thus 
inevitably cannot describe the physical phenomena exactly. Furthermore, in the calibration 
process to determine the model parameters, the presence of measurement uncertainty in the 
calibration data leads to uncertainty in model parameters. The two sources of uncertainty in 
model parameters and the parametric form of each model combine into modeling uncertainty in 
the calibrated models. 
In the residual generation step, the measurement uncertainty in live sensor readings combines 
with modeling uncertainty into the uncertainty of each residual computed at each time step. The 
immediate effect is that all residuals appear ‘noisy’. Subsequently, for the residual evaluation 
step, a statistical treatment is needed to decide at each given time if a residual is statistically zero 
or non-zero. Such statistical treatment is generally known as change detection. A residual is 
observed to be non-zero when its distribution is detected to have deviated from the original 
expected distribution.  
In statistical change detection, there are two types of detection error: 
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 Type I error (false positive): A residual is zero but detected to be non-zero. 
 Type II error (false negative): A residual is non-zero but detected to be zero. 
 
Consequently, the uncertainty in the value of each residual inevitably leads to uncertainty in the 
observed fault symptoms. There is an associated false alarm rate whenever a fault symptom is 
observed, and there is a possibility that some fault symptoms may not be detected.  
In the reasoning frameworks described in Chapter 2, one proceeds from a definite set of fault 
symptoms and cannot consider the possibility that the observed fault symptoms could be wrong. 
As discussed, in the presence of uncertainty, some of the observed symptoms could be false and 
some of the fault symptoms may be undetected. Performing reasoning on a set of incorrect fault 
symptoms would inevitably lead to false diagnoses. 
Furthermore, for practical applications, not all type of component faults and sensor faults are 
equally likely to occur. Such information, provided as the prior probability of each fault, is 
relevant to fault diagnosis. Dealing with the possibility of false alarms and the prior probability 
of different types of faults in the reasoning process is the topic of reasoning under uncertainty. 
4.2 Reasoning Under Uncertainty 
The two types of error in change detection lead to the possibility that an observed set of fault 
symptoms could be false. In general, such false alarm rates depend on the statistical change 
detection tool being used and the magnitude of the changes relatively to the uncertainty of the 
residuals. A straightforward approach in dealing with the possibility of false observations is to 
rely on a statistical change detection tool to minimize the false detection rates. Then if the false 
alarm rates can be reduced to a tolerable level, they can be neglected, and the two reasoning 
frameworks developed in Chapter 2 can be directly. Such treatment is referred to as deterministic 
reasoning. The term “deterministic” is used to emphasize that these reasoning approaches take 
the inputs as definite fact. The two deterministic reasoning approaches correspond to the two 
model-based diagnosis frameworks described in Section 2.4 are: 
 Deterministic I: Use statistical change detection to detect non-zero residuals then apply 
the MBD framework (summarized in Table 2-1) for fault diagnosis. 
 Deterministic II: Use statistical change detection to detect non-zero residuals then apply 
the FDI framework (summarized in Table 2-2) for fault diagnosis. 
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Information on prior probability of the faults can be used to eliminate some of the less probable 
diagnoses from the results obtained using Deterministic I or II. Various statistical change 
detection methods are summarized in the next section with the details to be provided in 
Appendix B.  
In general, however, it is not always possible to reduce the false alarm rates to a negligible level. 
For a given change detection method, the rate of type I error depends on the detection threshold 
whereas the rate of type II error depends on both the detection threshold and the magnitude of 
the change relatively to the uncertainty of the residual. Raising the detection threshold would 
reduce the rate of type I error but increase the rate of type II error. Also, the rate of type II error 
depends on the ratio between the change in mean value and the standard deviation representing 
the uncertainty. Recall that the residual uncertainty originates from both measurement 
uncertainty and modeling uncertainty. Thus, the rate of type II error depends on the quality of the 
component models used for diagnosis. 
Therefore, depending on the quality of the component models, it may not be possible to choose a 
detection threshold such that both type I and type II errors can be neglected. In that case, one 
must account for the possibility of false alarms in the reasoning process. This is the motivation 
for the probabilistic reasoning framework developed in this study and will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
4.3 Statistical Change Detection 
In the context of the current application, the problem of statistical change detection is to detect 
whether the mean value of a noisy residual has deviated from its normal value, i.e. changing 
from zero to non-zero. We will assume that the mean  0  and standard deviation  0  in the zero 
state are known or can be estimated. The new mean value after a change is unknown but the 
standard deviation is assumed to remain the same. The change in mean value can occur either as 
an abrupt shift or a slow drift. 
The most straightforward approach to detect a change in mean value is by using the limit-
checking method, formally known as the Shewhart control chart [87, 88]. A change is detected 
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when the difference between the current value and the normal mean exceeds a pre-defined 
threshold. This approach is easy to implement but it was shown to be less effective for detecting 
small changes [89]. 
Other approaches include the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) control chart 
and the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) test [89, 90]. The criteria to assess the performance of 
a change detection method includes detection delay, false positive and false negative rates. 
Comparison between various change detection methods can be found in [89]. We will be using 
the GLR test for the current application. The methodology of the GLR method is summarized in 
the remainder of this section. 
Consider a noisy variable that can be described by a Gaussian distribution with known mean 0  
and standard deviation 0 . After a change, the mean value of the variable shifts to an unknown 
value   . We would like to detect the change, estimate the time step at which the change started 
and the new mean  .  
The values of the variable, collected at discrete time steps, can be put into a time series { }ky . For 
the GLR test, at a time step k , a decision function can be evaluated using past values of the 
variable and a change is detected when the decision function exceeds a pre-defined threshold. 
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If a change is detected, the location of the change is the index j  that maximizes the above 
expression. The detection threshold can be defined based on a pre-defined tolerable false 
detection rate.  
For the case of slow drift in mean value, as opposed to an abrupt shift, a slight modification is 


































To demonstrate, consider the heat exchanger example with the residual 0r  computed for the heat 
transfer model given by Eqn. (3.28). Gaussian noise was added to simulate measurement 
uncertainty. The mean and standard deviation of the residual was estimated during normal 
operation when the residual can be considered statistically zero. The plot of the residual at each 
time step and the corresponding GLR-D decision function is shown in Figure 4-2. A change is 
detected when the decision function exceeds the detection threshold, shown by the red line on the 
right plot. 
 
Figure 4-2. Application of the GLR-D test to detect non-zero residual 
 
4.4 Deterministic Reasoning Approaches 
To demonstrate the two deterministic reasoning approaches, we consider again the example with 
a single-phase counter flow heat exchanger as analyzed in Chapter3. Simulation data was 
obtained for the heat exchanger using design parameters from those of a regenerative heat 
exchanger in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) of the Braidwood Nuclear 
Generating Station [3]. For reference, the operating conditions and geometry specifications are 
listed in Table 4-1, as modeled in the GPASS 1-D system code [94].  
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Table 4-1. Reference operating conditions and geometry specifications of the Braidwood CVCS 
regenerative HX 
Parameter Value 
Hotside mass flow rate (kg/s) 4.724 
Hotside inlet temperature (oC) 290 
Hotside pressure (MPa) 15.0 
Coldside mass flow rate (kg/s) 3.467 
Coldside inlet temperature (oC) 40 
Coldside pressure (MPa) 14.65 
Configuration Type Shell-Tube 
Number of tubes 256 
Tube inner diameter (mm) 9.525 
Tube outer diameter (mm) 12.633 
Shell inner diameter (m) 0.254 
Total length (m) 5.0 
Tube wall thermal conductivity (W/m.K) 25 
Tube wall roughness (m) 0.00001 
 
For the calibration process, GPASS simulation data with noise added for uncertainty was used to 
calibrate the UA  model given by Eqn. (3.21). The eight residuals were generated as described in 
Section 3.3. Afterwards, the mean 0  and standard deviation 0  of each residual was estimated 
using data sampled around the reference operating point. These distribution parameters 0 0( , )   
are needed for the GLR test to evaluate each residual. These steps are straightforward and are 
omitted here. 
Consider a scenario with sensor 3S  drifting out of calibration starting at certain time step. The 
sensor fault was simulated by an increasing bias added to its reading value. More specifically, 
the simulated fault started at 200cpt   with an increasing bias rate of 5% per 100 time-steps. 
Applying the GLR-D test to each of the 8 residuals, the results are plotted on Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3. GLR-D decision functions for the 8 residuals in a sensor fault scenario (left) and a zoomed-in 
version (right). 
The detection threshold, as shown by the dashed red line in Figure 4-3, was set to 8.3h   for a 
false positive rate of 0.1% . After sufficient wait-time, all the residuals except 3r  can be observed 
to be non-zero as their decision functions eventually exceed the threshold. The observed set of 
fault symptoms is (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T  after around timestep 236. We can now apply the two 
deterministic reasoning approaches to perform fault diagnosis. As already discussed in Section 
3.3, the diagnostic result by Deterministic I for this particular set of fault symptoms is given by 
Eqn. (3.31) consisting of 17 minimal diagnoses. The result by Deterministic II is 3[ ]F , which is 
the correct diagnosis. 
The notion of exoneration using zero residuals from the FDI framework allows Deterministic II 
to provide more detailed diagnostic results. However, in situations where that notion does not 
hold, the Deterministic II approach may fail to produce a valid diagnosis. In the presence of 
uncertainty, such situations arise more often due to the possibility of false negative in change 
detection, i.e. a residual with changed mean value detected to be zero. 
To elaborate on the limitation of the Deterministic II approach, notice in Figure 4-3 that for a 
period prior to time step 236, the GLR-D decision function for residual 6r  dropped below the 
detection threshold and the change detection algorithm failed to detect the change. During that 
period, the observed fault symptoms are (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0)T . For Deterministic I, we have a set of 5 
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minimal conflicts (see Table 3-2, excluding the last row) which lead to the following minimal 
diagnoses: 
 3 6] or [ ] or [ ] or [  for any , ,3,6[ , ]L i jFF FF F i j L  (4.3)                                 
In comparison with Eqn. (3.31), the consequence of the false negative, 6r  incorrectly observed to 
be zero, is that we now have one additional single-fault diagnosis 6F .  On the other hand, the 
deterministic II approach failed to produce a valid diagnosis since the combination of 3 0r    and 
6 0r   exonerates all 8 faults. 
Generally, in the presence of uncertainty, Deterministic II is more sensitive to errors in change 
detection. In Deterministic I, the effect of change detection false alarms often results in an 
increased number of possible diagnoses. On the other hand, in Deterministic II, the set of 
observed fault symptoms is required to exactly match the fault signature defined under the notion 
of exoneration. Thus, false alarms that invalidate the notion of exoneration often result in no 
valid diagnosis being found.  
An alternative approach to deal with such issue in Deterministic II is to use a concept of distance 
when matching the observed fault symptoms to fault signatures. Instead of requiring a fault 
signature to exactly match the observed symptoms, one can use a definition of distance, e.g. the 
norm of the difference, to find a fault signature closest to the observed set of fault symptoms. 
This way, the Deterministic II approach will always produce at least one diagnosis. However, in 
doing so, all false detection rates are implicitly assumed to be equal. Furthermore, in such 
process, one cannot incorporate information on the prior probability of each fault. Thus, in 
general, the shortest distance may not necessarily imply the most likely diagnosis. 
To overcome these issues, one must take account of both the fault prior probabilities and the 
possibility of false alarms in the reasoning process. In the next chapter, we will discuss the 
probabilistic reasoning framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis in which diagnostic 
results are determined based on the fault posterior probabilities computed using both prior 
probabilities and the conditional probabilities between related variables. 
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The characteristics of the two quantitative reasoning frameworks formulated in Chapter 2, 
namely the MBD and FDI frameworks, were discussed in Chapter 3. We have demonstrated that 
the MBD framework, inherently a logically sound framework, cannot fully utilize the 
information available from zero and non-zero residuals. The FDI framework relying on the 
notion of exoneration can generally provide more detailed diagnostic results. By applying the 
notion of exoneration, one must assume that a residual is only zero if none of the relevant faults 
in the underlying analytical redundancy relation is present. While the notion of exoneration is not 
mathematically exact, it can be considered a good approximation for practical use in the absence 
of measurement and modeling uncertainty. 
When considering various sources of uncertainty in a system, the straightforward approach is to 
neglect the possibility of false detections in evaluating residuals and directly apply the two 
quantitative reasoning frameworks. We referred to such approach as deterministic reasoning. 
The deterministic reasoning approaches are justifiable when the false alarm rates in evaluating 
noisy residuals can be minimized to an insignificant level by a statistical change detection tool. 
However, that is not always possible, especially when modeling uncertainty is significant. In 
particular, when modeling uncertainty is high relatively to the amplitude of the effects of the 
faults we are trying to detect, it may not be possible to reduce the possibility of false negative to 
a negligible level. When the false negative rate in residual evaluation is significant, non-zero 
residuals can be falsely detected to be zero and the notion of exoneration for zero residuals may 
longer be a good approximation. We have demonstrated the limitations of the two deterministic 
reasoning frameworks in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5  
Probabilistic Model-based Diagnosis Framework 
 59
In the two quantitative reasoning frameworks, diagnostic results are obtained from a definite set 
of observed fault symptoms. In the presence of uncertainty, false detections in evaluating noisy 
residuals could result in uncertain observation of fault symptoms. For a probabilistic reasoning 
framework, one must account for the possibility that some of the observations could be false in 
the reasoning process going from observed fault symptoms to fault diagnoses. Furthermore, for a 
general system, some faults are more likely to occur to others. Information on the prior 
probability of each fault is relevant to fault diagnosis, especially when there could be multiple 
valid diagnoses for the same set of fault symptoms. Incorporating both the prior probability of 
faults and the possibility of false observations into the reasoning process of fault diagnosis is the 
focus of this chapter on probabilistic reasoning. 
5.1 Probabilistic Reasoning using Bayesian Network  
As discussed in Chapter 2, each state of a system in a fault diagnosis problem can be identified 
by a set of faults. The physical cause-effect relations dictate that each set of faults result in a 
certain set of fault symptoms. In the reasoning process, we are interested in inferring the state of 
the system from an observed set of fault symptoms. In a probabilistic setting, the reasoning 
process becomes the task of computing the probability of each physical state given the set of 
observed symptoms, known as the posterior probability. 
To elaborate, let us consider the simplest case: a system with a single fault and a single 
observation denoted by binary variables F  and O , respectively. 0F   if the system is fault-
free and 1F   if the fault is present. Suppose that we cannot measure F  directly and can only 
make observations through O . From a model of the system, we know that 1F   would cause O  
to be 1 and thus, O  can be considered a fault symptom. The cause-effect relation is 1F   leads 
to 1O  . In the reasoning process for fault diagnosis, one can infer 1F   if O  is observed to be 
1. 
In the presence of noise and uncertainty, one cannot observe O  exactly and in general cannot 
establish deterministic cause-effect relations. Statements such that 1F   leads to 1O   must 
now be provided in terms of conditional probabilities, e.g. ( 1| 1)P O F  . In the forward cause-
effect direction, one must provide the probability ( )P F  for each value of F  known as the prior 
probability of the fault;  and ( | )P O F  for each combination of F  and O  known as the 
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likelihood of the observations. Intuitively, the prior probability indicates how likely it is for the 
fault to occur and the likelihood specifies how often each value of O  is observed in each state of 
the system. 
In performing probabilistic reasoning, one must compute the posterior probabilities ( | )P F O  for 
the observed value of O . If O  is observed to be 1, the posterior probability ( 1| 1)P F O   
indicates how probable it is that the fault is present. One can then conclude that the fault has 
















    (5.1) 
Since the prior probability ( )iP F  and likelihood ( | )i iP O F  are provided, the posterior 
probability can be computed if the marginal probability ( )iP O  is known. ( )iP O  is the 
probability to observe iO  regardless of whether the fault is present. ( )iP O  can be computed by 
summing over all possibilities in a process known as marignalization:  
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In fact, to decide if the fault has occurred, one only need to compare the relative magnitude of 
the posterior probability of the fault, ( 1| )iP F O , with that of the other possibility, 
( 0 | )iP F O . In that case, since ( )iP O  is common to the two posibilities, it may not be 
necessary to compute ( )iP O  explicitly.  
In summary, to perform probabilistic reasoning for this simple example, one need to provide the 
prior probability of the fault and the likelihood of the observations. Afterwards, the posterior 
probability of the fault can be computed. 
To apply this probabilistic reasoning process to a general problem of fault diagnosis, there are 
several complications. For a system in general, there are various faults and observations with 
each observation only affected by some of the faults. Furthermore, the faults may not directly 
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affect the observations, but the causal effects may propagate through various intermediate 
variables. Therefore, it is generally not possible to pre-determine the likelihood ( | )P O F  for 
complex systems. Instead, one must provide the conditional probability distributions of directly 
related variables. For instance, if the effects of fault F  propagate to O  through an intermediate 
variable r , one must provide the distributions ( | )P r F  and ( | )P O r  from which the likelihood 
( | )P O F  can be computed. 
The conditional dependencies between different variables in a system can be represented 
graphically by a Bayesian network. Formally, a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph 
whose nodes represent random variables and directed edges represent conditional dependent 
relations [95]. The arrow directions of the directed edges represent cause-effect directions. As an 
example, the simple system with a single fault F  and single observation O  we have considered 
above can be represented by the Bayesian network shown in Figure 5-1. 
  
 
In this case, we only have two nodes, representing the two variables F  and O . The direct effect 
of F  on O  is represented by the arrow between the two nodes. As discussed, for a general 
system, we may have any number of nodes and edges. To completely define a system for 
probabilistic reasoning, one need to define all the nodes to represent relevant variables, directed 
edges between the nodes to represent the cause-effect relations and provide the conditional 
probability distribution of each node on its parent nodes. Generally, the first layer, consisting of 
nodes with no parent nodes, represent physical states and the last layer represents observations. 





The structure of the Bayesian network allows one to compute the likelihood of the observations 
and from that the posterior probability of the physical states. 
5.2 Probabilistic Reasoning for Quantitative Model-Based Diagnosis 
In the framework of quantitative model-based diagnosis, the state of a system at any given time 
can be described by a set of faults. Faults, including component faults and sensor faults, can lead 
to changes in the mean values of certain model residuals which will be observed by change 
detection tools as non-zero residuals. The observations of zero and non-zero residuals in the 
evaluation of model residuals are the inputs for the reasoning process for fault diagnosis. 
More specifically, a fault can directly lead to changes in the mean value of a model residual. At 
the same time, the computed value of the residual is also affected by measurement and modeling 
uncertainty. The observation on whether the residual is statistically zero or non-zero is obtained 
from performing statistical change detection on the computed residual. Consider a system with a 
single fault mode and a single model residual, the dependencies between the variables can be 
represented by the following Bayesian network. 
 
The change detection output O  only depends on the time series of the computed values of 
residual r . At any given time, the value of r  depends on the various uncertainty sources and on 





Modeling Uncertainty  
Figure 5-2. General Bayesian network for quantitative model-based fault diagnosis 
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can be considered constant and thus can be omitted from the graph. To completely define the 
structure of the network, one need to specify the probability distributions for nodes, which in this 
case are ( )P F , ( | )P r F , and ( | )P O r . 
( )P F  the prior probability of the fault, indicating how likely it is for the fault to occur. The 
conditional probability distribution ( | )P r F  of residual r  on fault F  is directly related to the 
sensitivity of the residual on the fault. The conditional probability distribution ( | )P O r  of O  on 
r  is related to the sensitivity of the change detection tool. 
Note that the observation O  can be considered binary, i.e. 0  if the detection output is zero and 1 
if non-zero, but the residual r  and fault F  are natively continuous variables. One may take the 
magnitude of the fault as the continuous value for F . The change in mean value of residual r , 
as the result of a fault, is continuous and depends on the magnitude of the fault. In this case, one 
need to provide the conditional distributions ( | )P r F  and ( | )P O r  in forms of probability 
density functions. Alternatively, one may choose to discretize the fault F  and residual r  into 
binary variables: 
 1F   if the fault has occurred with magnitude exceeding a certain threshold; 0F   
otherwise. 
 1r   if there is a change in the mean value of the residual that exceeds a certain 
threshold; 0r   otherwise. 
The discretization of faults into binary variables comes naturally from the practical use. As is the 
case with deterministic reasoning, at any given time, we are mostly interested in whether a fault 
has occurred. Thus, each fault is practically a binary variable. Considering the residuals as binary 
variables, the CPTs ( | )P O r  can be computed directly from the false positive and false negative 
rates of the change detection tool. Such discretization process of the faults and residuals allows 
one to simplify the calculation and reduce the computational cost. Although the use of a finer 
discretization can theoretically provide more accurate computation, it is not necessary for the 
current practical application. 
The discretization of sensor faults is straightforward. For each sensor in practice, there are pre-
defined thresholds to determine when the sensor is considered out of calibration. One can then 
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simply define the binary sensor fault based on such thresholds. For component faults, the 
threshold may be set based on the effect of the fault on performance-related parameters. For 
example, one can set the threshold for the definition of fouling based on the change of the overall 
heat transfer coefficient in a heat exchanger. After the threshold for each fault is defined, the 
prior probability of the fault, ( )P F , may be assumed or estimated from past data.  
After the threshold for each residual is defined, one can estimate the distributions ( | )P r F  and 
( | )P O r  by based on the sensitivity of the residual on the fault and the characteristics of the 
change detection tool being used. The distributions ( | )P r F  and ( | )P O r  will be provided as 
conditional probability tables (CPTs) for each combination of the discrete variables: 
Table 5-1. Conditional probability tables for discrete faults and residuals 
 0F   1F   
0r   
| (0 | 0)r FP  | (0 |1)r FP  
1r   | (1| 0)r FP  | (1|1)r FP  
 
 0r   1r   
0O   
| (0 | 0)O rP  | (0 |1)O rP  
1O   
| (1| 0)O rP  | (1|1)O rP  
 
 
The entries for the ( | )P r F  CPT can be estimated by sampling the model being used to compute 
the residual. Let   be the shift in mean value that was used as the threshold to discretize the 
residual r .  Then, for example, | (1|1)r FP  is the probability that the change in residual r  as the 
effect of fault F  is larger than  . Each entry of the CPT for ( | )P r F  depends on the chosen 
threshold   and the sensitivity of the model to the fault F . 
In the CPT for ( | )P O r , | (1| 0)O rP  is the false positive rate, i.e. the probability to detect a change 
when 0r  . | (0 |1)O rP  is the false negative rate, the probability that a change is undetected. Note 
that the computed value for each residual is subject to measurement and modeling uncertainty. 
Let   denote the standard deviation of the residual as the result of the combined uncertainty. 
The ratio      is known as the signal-to-noise ratio. For each change detection tool, the 
false detection rates can be pre-computed as functions of the signal-to-noise ratio . 
The estimation process for the CPTs ( | )P r F  and ( | )P O r  depends on how the threshold   is 
defined. Physically, it is reasonable to set   based on the sensitivity of the fault, allowing 
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| (1|1)r FP  to be approximately set to 1.0 . In general, each residual may depend on multiple faults 
in which case one can set   based on the sensitivity of the least sensitive faults but will need to 
sample each combination of faults to compute the entries of the CPT. In this case, the ratio 
     is different for each residual and one will need to compute a ( | )P O r  CPT for each 
residual. An alternative, and somewhat more convenient, approach is to set   based on the 
‘noise level’  , i.e. choose the same      for all residuals. In that case, the same ( | )P O r  
table is applicable for all residuals and one just need to sample the model to compute the 
( | )P r F  table for each residual. 
In summary, a Bayesian network for probabilistic reasoning in quantitative model-based 
diagnosis consists of three layers: the nodes on the first layers represent different faults in the 
system; the second layer represents model residuals and the third layer represents change 
detection observations. Each residual may be connected to various faults as dictated by the 
underlying model. On the other hand, each change detection output only depends on the residual 
on which change detection is performed. To define the structure of the network, one needs to 
provide the prior probability ( )P F  and the conditional probability tables ( | )P r F  and ( | )P O r . 
After the diagnostic problem has been formulated in form of a Bayesian network with its 
structure defined, the existing methods of Bayesian inference can be applied to compute the 
posterior probability of each fault given a set of observation. The structure of the Bayesian 
network can be used as input for a generic Bayesian network tool or probabilistic reasoning 
engine to perform the posterior probability calculation. Efficient algorithms for such 
calculations, which fall outside the scope of this thesis, are omitted here. Overall, the 
probabilistic reasoning framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis is summarized to the 







Table 5-2. The proposed probabilistic reasoning framework for quantitative model-based diagnosis 
Step 1 
Identify available ARRs from component models, from which 
define possible residuals. 
Step 2 
Construct a Bayesian network representing the dependencies 
between faults and residuals 
Step 3 
Compute the posterior probability of each fault given a set of 
observed zero and non-zero residuals. 
Step 4 
Obtain the final diagnosis from faults with significant posterior 
probability. 
 
5.3 Results for the Heat Exchanger Example 
As an example, let us consider the case with a single-phase counterflow heat exchanger as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. The available residuals and related component and sensor faults 
have been identified in Chapter 3 and listed in Table 3-1. The diagnostic problem in this case can 
be represented by the Bayesian network in Figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3. A Bayesian network for fault diagnosis in the single-phase heat exchanger example 
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The first layer consists of eight nodes representing the eight component and sensor faults. The 
second layer represents the eight model residuals. Each relevant fault to a residual is connected 
to the residual by an arrow as shown. Effects of measurement and modeling uncertainty are 
considered constant and omitted in the drawing. Overall, the structure of the network represents 
the causality relations between faults, residuals and the observations. For instance, the true mean 
value of each residual depends on certain faults as indicated by the arrows: fault 0F   does not 
affect 0r  as there is no edge connecting the two.   
To completely define the Bayesian network, we must specify the conditional probability 
distribution at each node. To demonstrate the calculation of posterior probabilities in 
probabilistic reasoning, for this section we will assume the faults and residuals have been 
discretized into binary variables. For the first layer, we need to provide the prior probability of 
each fault, which usually depends on the fault type and time into the operation cycle. Prior 
probabilities can be estimated from past experience with the system. In this example, we will 
arbitrarily assume that at the time of consideration, sensors have a 5%  chance to be out of 
calibration; the prior probability for fouling in the heat exchanger is 10%  chance and that for 
leakage is 1% , making it the least likely fault: 
 1) 0.01( LP F    (5.3) 
 0 1) 0.10(P F    (5.4) 
 11) 0.0(  for5  iP F i   (5.5) 
The conditional probability of each residual on its relevant faults depends on the sensitivity of 
the underlying model to each fault. Furthermore, in multiple-fault scenarios, it is possible that 
faults can counteract one another. In general, the conditional probability distribution of each 
residual can be computed by sampling the underlying model. For the current demonstration, we 
will apply the two assumptions that were used for the notion of exoneration in the FDI 
framework: 
 A fault would result in a non-zero residual for all ARRs it involves in. 
 Multiple faults do not counteract one another to give a zero residual. 
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Under these assumptions, a residual is non-zero if at least one of its parent nodes takes value 1, 
thus: 
 ( all paren 0d0 | t no es 1.0)iP r    (5.6) 
 ( any pare 0o1| nt n de 1.1)iP r    (5.7) 
The conditional dependence of each observation iO , i.e. change detection output, on the true 
mean value of the residual ir   depends on the false positive and false negative rates of the change 
detection algorithm. These false detection rates depend on the specific change detection method 
being used, the change magnitude relatively to the variance and the chosen detection threshold. 
For the demonstration, suppose that the detection threshold has been chosen such that the false 
positive rate is 0.1%  and the false negative rate is 1.0% . Thus, by definition: 
 1| ) 0.001( 0i iP O r   (5.8) 
 10 | ) 0.0( 1i iOP r    (5.9) 
In Eqns. (5.3) - (5.9), we have provided the conditional probability for every node in the 
Bayesian network. Thus, the structure of the network is completely defined. Existing methods of 
Bayesian network can then be employed to compute the marginal probability and likelihood of 
each set of observations and from that the posterior probability for each fault or each diagnosis. 
For example, consider the case with the fault symptoms observed to be (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)TO  , as 
discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.4, the posterior probability for 3 1F  , i.e. for sensor iS   to be 
faulty, can be calculated to be: 
 3 1| (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1) ) 0.986(
TP F O    (5.10) 
The posterior probability of all other faults is negligible. Thus, we can conclude that 3F  is the 
most likely fault. Here 3 )( 1|P F O  represents the probability for fault 3F , i.e. sensor 3S  out of 
calibration, regardless of the status of the other faults. The probability for the single-fault 
diagnosis 3 )(  for |3, 0  1 iP F iF O   can be computed similarly and is slightly lower.  
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For the case with the fault symptoms (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0)TO  , which the Deterministic II approach 
failed to produce a valid diagnosis due to the invalid notion of exoneration, the two dominated 
possibilities are: 
 3 1| (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0) ) 0.498(
TP F O    (5.11) 
 6 1| (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0) ) 0.498(
TP F O    (5.12) 
The probability for other faults is less than 1%. Hence, we can conclude that the two most likely 
faults are 3F  and 6F . In comparison, recall the diagnosis produced by the Deterministic I 
approach, given by Eqn. (4.3), which includes [ ]LF  and multiple two-fault diagnoses, in addition 
to 3F  and 6F . Here we were able to use the posterior probability to eliminate [ ]LF  and the 
multiple-fault diagnoses.  
The proposed probabilistic framework requires posterior probability calculation for each fault in 
the system. This task could be computationally expensive if the number of possible faults is 
large. Additionally, it may be helpful to consider specific diagnosis instead of each fault 
independently, e.g. 3[ ]F  which implies 3 31, 0 for iF iF    instead of  3 1F   regardless of the 
other faults. The alternative approach is by combining the Deterministic I approach with the 
probabilistic framework: One can use the Deterministic I approach to produce a list of minimal 
diagnoses and then use the probabilistic framework to compute the posterior probability for each 
minimal diagnosis. Diagnoses with insignificant posterior probability can then be eliminated.   
The diagnostic results by the three reasoning approaches for the two scenarios of the single-
phase the heat exchanger example is summarized in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3. Results for the two diagnostic scenarios for the single-phase HX 
Symptoms Deterministic I Deterministic II Probabilistic 
(1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1)T   3 3[ ,] ] or [ ] or [  for any , ,L i jF iFF j LF   3[ ]F  3[ ]F  
(1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0)T   3 6] or [ ] or [ ] [ L F FF  or 
[  for a 6, ] ny , ,3,i jF i LF j    
None found 
3[ ]F  or 6[ ]F  
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Effectively in this probabilistic framework, information from zero residuals can be utilized in a 
similar manner to the notion of exoneration but without suffering its limitation due to false 
detections in residual evaluations. Overall, by considering the possibility of false alarms and the 
prior probability of each fault in the reasoning process, the probabilistic approach can provide 
improved diagnostic results in the presence of modelling and measurement uncertainty.  
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The methods we have discussed in the last four chapters constitute the overall quantitative 
diagnostic framework. In Chapter 3, physics-based models are constructed to describe the fault-
free behavior of T-H components. Quantitative residuals can be generated from each component 
model to serve as possible fault symptoms. Chapter 2 provides the reasoning frameworks to 
obtain valid fault diagnoses from a set of observed fault symptoms. The presence of 
measurement and modeling uncertainty affects all the steps from model construction, residual 
generation to diagnostic reasoning. Treatments of the effects of uncertainty are discussed in 
Chapter 4 and 5. The overall process has been demonstrated for the example of a single-phase 
heat exchanger. 
To apply this physics-based diagnostic framework to complex T-H systems, the general strategy 
is to decompose each system into separate components of known generic types whose physical 
behavior can be described by pre-defined models. Fault-free models for each generic component 
type can be formulated from the underlying physical laws in forms of parametric models. Each 
parametric model may contain a few unknown parameters which are to be determined in a 
process, referred to as model calibration, for each specific component by using training data 
obtained from measured data of various process variables on the boundary of the component.  
To provide the required measured data for the model calibration process, a certain number of 
sensors available to the component is needed. For the discussion in the previous chapters, we 
have assumed that there are enough sensors on the boundary of each component for that purpose. 
That is not usually the case in practice. In fact, most T-H systems in nuclear power plants are not 
fully instrumented and it is rarely the case that one has sufficient sensors to allow the calibration 
of the parametric models for each standalone component. To improve the diagnostic capability, 
Chapter 6  
System Level Diagnosis 
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one needs to utilize information available not just locally to each component but also from other 
components and sensors in the system. 
In case the sensor set available at the inlet and outlet of a component is insufficient for the 
calibration process, there are two possible directions one can follow for a solution: 
 Construct parametric models for a combination of multiple components that can then be 
calibrated by the available sensor set. 
 Compute the missing sensors by utilizing other sensors at system level and the relations 
between the component with nearby component on its upstream and downstream. 
The first solution produces aggregate models as permitted by the available sensors, i.e. physics-
based models covering multiple physical components. The second option gives rise to the 
concept of virtual sensors. Virtual sensors are created in place of missing physical sensors by 
solving system balance equations. The calculation of each virtual sensors involves certain 
physical sensors and components. For the purpose of model construction, during which the 
system can be considered fault-free, each virtual sensor acts as a physical sensor to provide 
calibration data for component models. For fault diagnosis, special care must be taken since the 
validity of each virtual sensor depends on the status of the involved components and physical 
sensors. For the framework developed in this thesis, both concepts of aggregate models and 
virtual sensors are utilized to maximize the diagnostic capabilities for T-H systems with limited 
sensor sets.  
6.1 Virtual Sensors 
For each T-H component of a known generic type, one can formulate models to describe its 
performance in the processes of mass, momentum and energy transport. Physics-based models 
for the component are generally expressed by parametric models with a few unknown 
parameters. For each component model, the process of determining the model parameters and the 
subsequent use of the model in monitoring the component require measurement data of certain 
process variables. For example, as discussed in Section 3.1, the mass balance model for a single 
inlet/outlet component requires two flowrate sensors whereas the momentum model require two 
pressure sensors and a flowrate sensor.  
 73
Ideally, measured data for the required variables are provided by sensors at the inlet and outlet of 
the component. When a required sensor is missing, one can try to solve for the underlying 
process variables by using reading values of other physical sensors and the conservation laws 
available at system level. Balance equations among components at system level may allow one 
to solve for certain process variables on the boundary of each component. This is the main idea 
for the concept of virtual sensor. We will refer to this concept of virtual sensor, obtained from 
solving balance equations to be used in both model construction and subsequently in fault 
diagnosis, as type I virtual sensor. 
Definition 6-1. A type I virtual sensor is the analytical solution of a process 
variable that is required for the construction of certain component models but 
there is no available physical sensor for that purpose. 
 
Additionally, we have demonstrated in Section 3.3 for the example of a single-phase heat 
exchanger that even with a full set of sensors, one may generate additional residuals by using 
different combinations of sensors. In that case, for each of the additional residuals, one sensor 
was left out and the underlying process variable was computed from the other sensors. The 
additional residuals helped differentiate sensor faults from component faults. As each residual 
could potentially serve as a fault symptom, maximizing the number of residuals would help 
improving the resolution of diagnostic results. This is the motivation for a second type of virtual 
sensors, henceforth referred to as type II virtual sensors. Even if a physical sensor is already 
available, it may be helpful to create a type II virtual sensor for the underlying variable to be 
used as an alternative for the purpose of maximizing the number of model residuals. Type II 
virtual sensors are utilized for residual generation and not needed during model construction. 
Definition 6-2. A type II virtual sensor is the analytical solution of a process 
variable that can be used as the alternative of a physical sensor or type I virtual 
sensor in the process of generating model residuals. 
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6.1.1 Type I Virtual Sensors  
The process variables of interest in a T-H system can be characterized to flowrate, pressure and 
enthalpy. Under the quasi-static condition, the conservation laws for a control volume, given by 
Eqns. (3.1) – (3.3) in Chapter 3, can be written as simple balance equations providing constraints 
between T-H process variables at various locations in a system. When the system is fault-free, 
there is no loss of mass and external heat loss can be considered negligible. In that case, 
collections of system level mass and heat balance equations may be used to solve for virtual 
sensors of flowrate and enthalpy type. On the other hand, since pressure loss is a crucial part of 
the momentum equation, it is generally not possible to create virtual sensors for pressure.  
Type I virtual sensors will be constructed solely from solving system balance equations. If a 
virtual sensor is solvable, its value is valid if and only if all the involved balance equations are 
valid, i.e. the involved sensors and components must be free of the related faults. Such 
conditions can be assumed in the model construction process during which the system can be 
considered fault-free. Type I virtual sensors are constructed firstly for model calibration 
purposes. In the subsequent use of such virtual sensor for residual generation, one must keep 
track of the relevant faults that can invalidate the virtual sensor. 
More specifically, the mass balance equation for a block of a system with an arbitrary number of 
inlet and outlet points is given by: 
 in outw w   (6.1) 
where w  denotes a flowrate variable and the subscripts indicate either inlet or outlet locations. 
The validity conditions for this equation include no fault among the flowrate sensors and no 
leakage in any component in the block. 
Similarly, the heat balance equation for a system block with no heat-exchanging component is 
given by: 
 in in out outw wh h    (6.2) 
where the h ’s denote enthalpy values. For heat exchangers, the heat balance equation is given 
by: 
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    
cold side hot sideio tut in n ou
w h hh w h           (6.3) 
The validity conditions for heat balance equations in general include no sensor faults, no leakage 
for the involved component and no faults that can cause significant external heat loss, if 
applicable.  
Given the structure of a system, mass and heat balance equations can be generated and collected, 
each involves certain virtual sensors. One can then put the equations into groups of common 
unknowns and search for solvable virtual sensors. If a virtual sensor can be solved from a certain 
group of balance equations, its computed value is valid only if all equations in the group are 
valid. One can keep track of the relevant faults that can invalidate the virtual sensor from the 
involved components and sensors in each equation. 
6.1.2 Type II Virtual Sensors 
In the previous section, type I virtual sensors are obtained from solving system balance 
equations. Type I virtual sensors are created to provide the required data for the model 
construction process as opposed to type II virtual sensors which are only created and used in the 
subsequent residual generation process after all available models have been constructed. 
Having various component models constructed using physical sensors and type I virtual sensors, 
one can then utilize both model predictions and system balance equations to create additional 
virtual sensors of type II. Type II virtual sensors are created for the purpose of increasing the 
number of independent model residuals one can generated for the system in order to improve the 
diagnostic resolution. 
The availability of type II virtual sensors is system- and situation-specific. We recall from 
Section 3.3 that for a single-phase heat exchanger, when a full set of six physical sensors are 
available, the six sensors are constrained by the heat balance equation: 
 in out out in( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
h h h c c cw h T h T w h T h T          (6.4) 
where enthalpy values are evaluated as functions of temperature readings. Under the assumption 
that this equation holds, one can predict the value of each sensor from the other five sensors. For 
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example, the prediction for inlet temperature on the cold side is in,p
cT  such that in,p in,p( )
c ch T h  
with: 
 in,p out in out( ) ( ) ( )
h
c c h h
c
w
h h T h T h T
w
      (6.5) 
In this case, in,p
cT  is a type II virtual sensor in additional to the available physical sensor in
cT . To 
generate residuals from the heat transfer model, one has the option to use either the physical 
sensor or its alternative - the type II virtual sensor.  
As with type I virtual sensors, when using a type II virtual sensor for residual generation in fault 
diagnosis, one must keep track of the relevant faults that can invalidate its value. In this case, it is 
clear that in,p
cT  is only valid if there is no fault among the five sensors being used and the balance 
equation holds. Thus, the relevant faults include five sensor faults, leakage in the heat exchanger 
and any other faults that can violate the balance equation. 
In principle, type II virtual sensors can be created from any model predictions. However, in the 
presence of uncertainty, both measurement and modeling uncertainty can combine in the model 
predictions use for type II virtual sensors. When such type II virtual sensors are used to compute 
a residual, uncertainty from multiple models can combine resulting in high uncertainty for the 
residual. To utilize such residuals in fault diagnosis, the residual evaluation tool and 
subsequently the reasoning framework must have the capability to tolerate such scenarios. In this 
thesis, the probabilistic reasoning framework developed to deal with cases when measurement 
and modeling uncertainty are significant, thus can be expected to fulfil that role.  
6.2 Aggregate Models 
After all type I virtual sensors have been identified for a system, one can proceed to construct 
component models from the combined set of physical sensors and virtual sensors. It is often the 
case that even with the addition of type I virtual sensors, it is not possible to construct models for 
every separate component. In that case, one must resort to models of multiple nearby 
components, which we refer to as aggregate models. 
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Recall from the discussion previously that type I virtual sensors are limited to flowrate and 
temperature/enthalpy variables only. It is not possible to obtain virtual pressure sensors from 
balance equations. In addition to the condition of no sensor faults, virtual flowrate sensors 
obtained from solving balance equations are only valid if there is no leakage in the involved 
components. Similar conditions apply for virtual temperature or enthalpy sensors. 
Aggregate Mass Models 
Mass balance models are created for the purpose of detecting leakage and therefore should only 
involve physical flowrate sensors. As a generalization of the discussion in Section 3.1, an 
aggregate mass balance model can be constructed for any block of components if a physical 
flowrate sensor is available at every inlet and outlet point. The aggregate mass model is 
expressed by: 
 in outw w   (6.6) 
where each inlet inw  or outlet outw  flowrate must be available by a physical sensor. 
Aggregate Momentum Models 
In Section 3.1.2, we have developed a momentum model for a component with a single inlet and 
single outlet. For the generalization to aggregate momentum models, we limit our consideration 
to a block of isolated components between single inlet and outlet points. The term ‘isolated’ is to 
emphasize that there is no external mass exchange in between the inlet and outlet. More 
specifically, for a part of the system under single-phase flow between a single inlet and outlet, 
the overall pressure loss can be expressed as a parametric model of the flowrate as: 
 in out ( )P P f w   (6.7) 
where inP  and outP  are the inlet and outlet pressure readings and w  is a flowrate reading at either 
the inlet and outlet; ( )f w  is the parametric form of the model. Generally, we can use the 
quadratic form as provided by Eqn. (3.11). As mentioned, there is no virtual sensors for pressure 
variables thus both inP  and outP  must be provided by physical sensors. On the other hand, the 
flowrate reading may be obtained from a type I virtual sensors. Given the structure of a system, 
one can search for all available pressure models satisfying these conditions. 
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Aggregate Energy Models 
Unlike mass end momentum models, the energy process is only relevant to specific component 
types, e.g. pumps or heat exchangers. Thus, energy models are only constructed for separate 
components of relevant types. The sensor requirement is model-specific. In general, flowrate and 
enthalpy variables at the inlet and outlet of each component are of interest which must be 
provided by either available physical sensors or type I virtual sensors. 
For the example of the single-phase heat exchanger described in Section 3.1.3, the full set of six 
sensors for the construction of the heat transfer model include the two flowrates, inlet and outlet 
temperatures on each side. If only five of those six are available, the missing sensor can be 
replaced by the virtual sensor computed using the heat balance equation. 
6.3 Fault Diagnosis at the System Level 
Following the framework developed in this thesis, the overall process to perform fault diagnosis 
at system level for arbitrary T-H systems is summarized by the flowchart in Figure 6-1. 
A model library is developed with specifications on possible models for each generic T-H 
component type. The model specifications include information on sensor requirement and 
possible generalization to include multiple components in aggregate models. 
After the P&ID specifying the structure of the system is imported, all virtual sensors that could 
be helpful for model construction is spawned by comparing the available sensor set against the 
sensor requirement provided by the model library. Balance equations throughout the system are 
collected to determine solvable virtual sensors. We referred to these solvable variables as type I 
virtual sensors. Unsolvable virtual sensors are then discarded. 
The next step is to search for available models, including component-specific models and 
aggregate models as allowed by the available physical sensors and active type I virtual sensors. 
From the available models, we can then define additional type II virtual sensors for residual 
generation.  
For each virtual sensor, including both types, information on the involved sensors and 
component faults is stored. These are the faults that can invalidate the computed value of the 
virtual sensor. From the available models, different model residuals can be defined using both 
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real sensors and virtual sensors. The structure of each residual, i.e. the sensors and components 
involved in the underlying ARR, is identified and stored. 
The next step is to determine the unknown parameters in each model in a model calibration 
process using a set of training data. Afterwards, model uncertainty and the uncertainty in each 
model residual are quantified. Information on the distribution of each model residual, i.e. its 
mean and variance, will be used by the statistical change detection tool selected for the residual 
evaluation step. 
For each new time step, live sensor readings are collected and imported. System balance 
equations are then solved to update the value of available virtual sensors. The value of each 
model residual is then updated for the new time step. Afterwards, each residual is evaluated by a 
change detection tool to determine if the residual is statistically zero or non-zero. 
After the residual evaluation step, the list of zero and non-zero residual will be used as input for 
the reasoning process for fault diagnosis. To perform diagnosis, we have the option to use either 
one of the deterministic reasoning frameworks as discussed in Section 4.2 or the probabilistic 
reasoning framework developed in Chapter 5. Diagnostic result is obtained from the reasoning 
engine and updated after each time step. 
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Figure 6-1. Overall scheme of the proposed system level diagnostic framework 
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Recall that to perform the reasoning process in quantitative model-based diagnosis, one needs to 
know the dependency structure of each residual. For the deterministic reasoning frameworks, the 
list of relevant faults that can cause a residual to become non-zero is needed to construct a 
conflict relation from each non-zero residual. For the probabilistic framework, the structure of 
each residual is needed to construct a Bayesian network for the system.  
To clarify the reasoning process in system level diagnosis, it should be emphasized that each 
residual, even if computed from a component-specific model, may involve other components and 
sensors at system level. More specifically, the calculation of each model residual may involve 
one or more virtual sensors whose validity depends on other system components and sensors. 
The dependency structure of a model residual in general is given by the flowchart in Figure 6-2. 
A fault can cause a non-zero model residual in two ways: either by directly affecting the model 
used for residual generation or by affecting the balance equations or model predictions used in 
the calculation of the involved virtual sensors. 
 
In general, the list the relevant faults to each residual may include not just faults from the 
components and sensors directly involved in the underlying model but also the faults that can 
invalidate the involved virtual sensors. Such list of relevant faults will be generated and stored 
when each model residual is defined.  




Components Physical Sensors Virtual Sensors 
Balance Equations 
Model Predictions 
Physical Sensors Components 
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7.1 System Description 
In this chapter, to demonstrate the proposed diagnostic framework, we will consider various 
diagnostic scenarios in a high-pressure feedwater system of a typical PWR plant. The high-
pressure feedwater system is part of the condensate and feedwater system that is responsible for 
the supply of pre-heated feedwater to the steam generators. Exhausts from the turbines turn into 
condensate and get heated up by feedwater heaters in multiple heating stages before re-entering 
the steam generators. The high-pressure feedwater system we are considering here consists of the 
two heating stages closest to the inlets of the steam generators, referred to as the first-point and 
second-point stages. Detailed description of such system can be found, for example, in the final 
safety analysis report for Unit 1 and 2 of the North Anna Power Station [96]. The structure of the 
system in consideration is illustrated by the P&ID in Figure 7-1. 
The feedwater heater in each stage is of the closed two-shell type and thus, each heating stage 
effectively consists of two feedwater heaters in parallel piping lines [96]. Therefore, for this 
example we have four feedwater heaters: two first-point heaters, labeled by 1-FW-E-1A and 1-
FW-E-1B, and two second-point heaters, labeled by 1-FW-E-2A and 1-FW-E-2B, as shown by 
the P&ID in Figure 7-1. The system as shown also include three steam generator feed pumps, 
labeled by 1-FW-P-1A to -P-1C, and three drain pumps, labeled by 1-SD-P-1A to -P-1C. 
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Figure 7-1. The P&ID of a high-pressure feedwater system 
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From the top of the P&ID, two-phase mixtures from the high-pressure turbine and moisture 
separator reheaters flow into the shells of the first and second-point heaters. Drains from the 
first-point heaters flow into the shells of the second-point heaters. On the right of the P&ID, 
feedwater from later heating stages flows through the two second-point heaters to the suction 
header of the feed pumps. Drains from the two-point heater shells are collected by the high-
pressure heater drain receivers, TK-2A and TK-2B. Drains from the moisture separators (not 
shown in Figure 7-1) are collected by a third drain receiver, TK-2C. The three drain pumps pump 
condensate from the drain receivers to the suction header of the feed pumps. During normal 
operation, only two of the three feed pumps operate to pump feedwater through the two first-
point heaters to a discharge header to supply the steam generators. In emergency situations, 
excessive drains from the first-point heaters and the drain receivers are collected by a condenser. 
All the valves to the condenser are otherwise closed off during normal operation. 
The yellow tags in Figure 7-1 indicate the sensors typically available for such system. Each label 
containing PT denotes a pressure sensor, FE denotes a flowrate sensor and TE denotes a 
temperature sensor. For brevity, we will use short-handed labels when referring sensors. For 
example, E2.T, with E2 being the location label and T the variable type, refers to the temperature 
sensor at the inlet of FWH 1B as shown in Figure 7-1. A Dymola simulation model for this 
system has been developed at Argonne National Laboratory [97]. Simulation data from the 
model will be used for the analysis in this chapter.  
For this demonstration, we will exclude the condenser from the P&ID as all its incoming piping 
lines are normally closed. The components in the system can be characterize by known generic 
types. Each drain receiver will be treated as coolant tank. Model development for each generic 
component type is discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Vertical Feedwater Heaters 
The feedwater heaters in this example are of the vertical channel down shell-tube design. The 
steam and water flow paths in a typical heater of this design are illustrated by the diagram in 
Figure 7-2 [98]. Steam flows in on the shell side, exchanges heat with the feedwater on the tube 
side and turns into condensate collected in the drain pool. In general, if the inlet steam is 
superheated, the shell side of the heater consists of three sections: a de-superheating section, a 
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condensing section and a drain cooling section. The feedwater on the tube side remains in the 
subcooled regime throughout the heating process. 
For the system in consideration, we have two-
phase mixtures, i.e. wet steam, coming into 
the shell side of the feedwater heaters. Thus, 
the shell of each heater consists of only two 
sections, condensing and drain cooling, 
without the de-superheating section. For 
normal operating conditions, the water level 
of the drain cooling section is maintained 
relatively constant by a level control system. 
For the diagnostic problem, we are interested 
in using sensor readings at the inlet and outlet 
of the heater to monitor its performance. As 
with the example of the single-phase 
counterflow heat exchanger analyzed in 
Section 3.1.3, the performance-related criteria 
include the heat balance and overall heat 
transfer capability. 
Recall that with the single-phase heat 
exchanger, to establish the heat balance 
equation, we need six sensors: mass flowrate, 
inlet temperature and outlet temperature for 
each side. Temperature readings are used to 
compute the corresponding enthalpy values. From these six sensors, the heat transfer 
performance of the single-phase heat exchanger can be evaluated in terms of the overall heat 
transfer coefficient UA . If only five out of those six sensors are available, one can make the 
assumption that the heat balance equation, Eqn. 3.14, is valid and from that compute the missing 
sensor. Thus, a set of five sensors is the minimum requirement for one to evaluate UA  and from 
that construct a performance model for the single-phase heat exchanger. 
Figure 7-2. Steam and water flow paths in a typical 
vertical high-pressure feedwater heater [98] 
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To apply the same procedure to the feedwater heater, note that we have wet steam at the inlet of 
the shell side whose enthalpy depends strongly on two variables: pressure and steam quality. 
Thus, to check for the heat balance, a set of seven sensors is required: feedwater flow rate, 
feedwater inlet and outlet temperatures, steam inlet pressure, steam inlet quality, drain flowrate 
and drain temperature. Locations of these sensors on the steam and water flow paths are shown 
by the diagram in Figure 7-3. 3T  and 4T  are the intermediate feedwater temperatures leaving and 
re-entering the drain cooling section.  
 
Figure 7-3. Simplified schematic of the vertical HP feedwater heater. 
3T  and 4T  can be computed from the heat balance equations. The other variable labels as shown 
in Figure 7-3 denote the full set of seven sensors: each label T  denotes a temperature sensor, w  
denotes mass flowrate, p  denotes pressure and x  denotes steam quality. 
Steam quality sensors are generally not available and in that case one must assume the heat 
balance in order to compute the steam inlet enthalpy. Thus, by a similar analysis as with the 
single-phase heat exchanger, the minimum sensor requirement to evaluate the performance of the 
feedwater heater is a set of six sensors, as shown in Figure 7-3 excluding steam quality. 
The dashed line in Figure 7-3 representing the water level separating the condensing zone and 
the drain cooling zone. The condensing zone is responsible for most of the heat transfer rate in 
the heater. Wet steam from the shell side inlet can be considered to completely condense to 
saturated liquid as it reaches the boundary of the drain cooling zone. 
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The heat transfer rate between the outgoing feed water and the drain pool can be considered 
negligible and thus 4 out
cT T . The intermediate temperature 3T  can be computed from the heat 
balance equation for the condensing zone: 
 out 3 in in sat in( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
c c h h h hw h T h T w h p x h p          (7.1) 
where sath  denoted the water saturation enthalpy at the given pressure. 
The overall heat transfer coefficient of the condensing zone can be evaluated from a LMTD 
model: 
 























where sat sat in( )
hpT T  is the saturation temperature at the given pressure in
hp . The total heat 
transfer rate of the condensing zone, cQ , is given by either side of the heat balance equation in 
Eqn. (7.1). It should be emphasized that the flow path of the feedwater in the condensing zone is 
a two-pass U-tube. To evaluate the overall heat transfer coefficient in practice, one usually needs 
to include a correction factor tF  into the LMTD model to account for the two-pass geometry 
[85]. The correction factor tF  is typically a function of the temperature profile along the flow 
path. For diagnostic purpose, here we are effectively lumping tF  into the overall coefficient cUA  
and assume the dependence on small variation of temperature is negligible.  
As with the single-phase heat exchanger, we will now construct a parametric model for cUA  as a 
function of the two flow rates, assuming the water level of the drain cooling section can be 
considered constant. The functional form of the parametric model depends on the flow and heat 
transfer condition on each side. For the tube side, the feedwater remains subcooled and thus the 
dependence of cUA  on the tube side flow rate 
cw  can be taken to be the same as in the single-
phase heat exchanger, given by Eqn. (3.21). For the shell side, the heat transfer process can be 
described as vertical film condensation. For turbulent flow outside vertical tubes, the 
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 (7.3) 
where f , fk  and f  are respectively the density, heat conductivity and viscosity of the 
condensate, evaluated at the tube wall temperature; Reb  is the Reynold’s number of the 
condensate flow. 
Following the same procedure as with the single-phase heat exchanger, we have the following 
parametric model for the overall heat transfer coefficient in the condensing zone: 









    (7.4) 
where 10 , 11  and 12  are the three model parameters to be determined using training data. 
For the drain cooling zone, most of the heat transfer takes place between the incoming leg of the 
feedwater and the drain pool. Similarly, the overall heat transfer coefficient of the drain cooling 
zone is given by a LMTD model: 
 



















  (7.5) 
 3 in sat in out( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
c c h h h
dQ w h T h T w h p h T           (7.6) 
The parametric model for the overall heat transfer coefficient of the drain cooling zone can be 
taken to be that of a single-phase exchanger by: 









    (7.7) 
with three model parameters 20 , 21  and 22 . 
Eqn. (7.4) and (7.7) provide two parametric models for the heat transfer coefficients that can be 
used to monitor the performance of the feedwater heater. To calibrate these models, one need to 
sensor data to evaluate the heat transfer coefficients from Eqn. (7.2) and (7.5). For that, a 
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minimum of six sensors is required: cw , hw , in
cT , out
cT , in
hp  and out
hT . Provided enough sensors, 
these models can be calibrated and used to generate residuals for model-based diagnosis. 
Other Components 
The other major components of the system as shown in Figure 7-1 include the feed pumps and 
drain pumps. For each pump, the two performance-related parameters of interest are the pressure 
head, out inP P , and consumed power, W . As discussed in Chapter 3, for a general variable-speed 
pump, both the pump head and power can be described by parametric models of the rotational 
speed n  and flow rate w : 
 out in ( , )P P f n w   (7.8) 
 ( , )W g n w  (7.9) 
The functional forms ( , )f n w  and ( , )g n w  can be obtained from the pump specifications or 
analytically formulated. For constant speed pumps, both the head and power reduce to function 
of only the total flow rate w . Unless a specific performance curve is provided for ( )f w , one can 
take the quadratic parametric form as described in Section 3.1.2. To calibrate the head model for 
a constant-speed pump, the required sensors are flowrate w , inlet pressure inP  and outlet 
pressure outP . To calibrate the power model, a sensor reading for the consumed power is 
required. For variable-speed pumps, an additional sensor for the pump speed is required. 
For the rest of the system, the drain receivers, without being fully instrumented, will be treated as 
a mass source/sink. The valves, including motor-operated valves and pressure-operated valves, 
will be treated as generic pressure loss components as no reading on the opening of each valve is 
available.  
7.2 Virtual Sensors and Balance Equations 
By comparing the available sensors at the inlet and outlet of each component to the sensor 
requirement for the construction of its models, it is straightforward to check for the missing 
sensors and from that create all possible virtual sensors. One must then collect all the available 
system balance equations and from that determine which of the virtual sensors created previously 
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are solvable. Only solvable virtual sensors are kept, which we referred to as type I virtual 
sensors, the rest are discarded. For the system in consideration, among the missing sensors, the 
most notable virtual sensors that are solvable and of interest to us are the feedwater flowrate for 
the two first-point feedwater heaters (FWHs).  
More specifically, as described in Section 7.1, the full sensors set for each FWH consists of 
seven sensors, at least six of which are required for the construction of its heat transfer 
coefficient models. As shown in Figure 7-1, only five of those sensors are available for each of 
the first-point FWH. Thus, the available sensor set for each FWH is insufficient for the 
construction of the FWH model. 
 
Figure 7-4. Type I virtual sensors for the two first-point FWHs 
The two missing sensors are for each first-point FWH are: feedwater flowrate and steam inlet 
quality, or equivalently steam inlet enthalpy. The locations of the missing sensors are shown by 
the red labels, 1.F w , 1.D w , 2.F w , and 2.D w , in Figure 7-4. Additionally, notice that the two 
first-point FWHs share the same steam inlet condition whose enthalpy is denoted by sh . 
The balance equations involving these virtual sensors are: 
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where the capitalized labels denote measurement locations for brevity. The first equation 
establishes the mass balance between the feedwater flowrate from the two first-point FWHs with 
the total flowrate to the steam generators. The second and third equations enforce the same steam 
inlet condition for the two FWHs. The fourth and fifth equations are the heat balance equations 
for the two FWHs. With five equations and five unknowns, the virtual sensors are solvable. 
Other solvable virtual sensors include to total mass flowrate from the feed pump suction header, 
flowrate coming out of each drain receiver, total flowrate from the two second-point FWHs. For 
the second-point FWHs, each has three missing sensors, none of which is solvable. The missing 
flow rate for each feed pump is also unsolvable.  
7.3 Model Construction and Residual Generation 
The calibration and subsequent use of each component or aggregate model in diagnostics require 
measured data of a certain number of process variables. Such required measurements can be 
provided by either physical sensors or type I virtual sensors. After all solvable type I virtual 
sensors have been identified, the next step is to determine all possible component and aggregate 
models as allowed by the set of available physical sensors and type I virtual sensors.  
For the current system, no mass balance model is available as each mass model requires a full set 
of physical flowrate sensors for all inlets and outlets. 
The generic pressure model for each single inlet/outlet block of components require two pressure 
readings and one flowrate reading. One model of this type is available between the feed pump 
suction header and the discharge header. For each drain pump, the available sensor set allows a 
model for the pressure head. No model is possible for the individual feed pump. We will use a 
quadratic form for the parametric models of the generic pressure model and the pump head, as 
described in Eqn. (3.11) and (3.12). 
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Notice that the two first-point FWHs are on parallel piping lines. From the constraint of equal 
pressure loss on each line, one can construct a flow ratio model to monitor the flowrate ratio 
between the two line. There are no physical flow rate sensors available for these two piping lines, 
but the virtual flow rate sensors constructed for the two FWHs can be used for this purpose. If 
the system is fault-free, one can expect the flow ratio to remain constant. 
Since no power meter is available for the pumps, it is not possible to construct pump power 
models. For the FWHs, the addition of the virtual flowrate sensor for the feedwater side allows 
us to construct a heat transfer model for each first-point FWH. No model is possible for the 
second-point FWHs as the available sensor set is insufficient. 
A summary of the available models is provided in Table 7-1.  
Table 7-1. Available diagnostic models for the high-pressure feedwater system. 




Feed pumps 1A and 1B, 
valves, FWH 1A and 1B, pipes 
Leakage, Blockage 
2 FR-1 Flow ratio FWHs 1A and 1B, pipes Leakage, Blockage 
3 SDP-1A Pump head Drain pump 1A Pump fault 
4 SDP-1B Pump head Drain pump 1B Pump fault 
5 SDP-1C Pump head Drain pump 1C Pump fault 
6 FWH-1A HX performance FWH 1A Leakage, Fouling 
7 FWH-1B HX performance FWH 1B Leakage, Fouling 
 
DP-1 is the generic pressure difference between the feed pump suction header and discharge 
header near the inlet of the steam generators. The pressure difference between those two points 
depends on the pressure gain provided by the pumps and the pressure loss along the piping lines. 
Recall that for normal operation, only two of the feed pumps are running.  
From these models, one can generate model residuals for diagnostics. In Chapter 3, we have 
discussed possible residuals for each model type. For the model DP-1, we can generate a residual 
from the model prediction of the pressure difference: 
 1 out in( ) )(pr w PP P    (7.11) 
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where ( )pP w  is the model prediction of the pressure difference, as a function of the flowrate 
reading w ; inP  and outP  are the inlet and outlet pressure measured at the feed pump suction 
header and discharge header, respectively. The calculation of this residual involves three sensors 
for w , inP , and outP . 
From the model FR-1, we can generate a residual to monitor changes in the flow rate ratio. The 
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 (7.12) 
The calculation of 2r  involves two type I virtual sensors 1.F w  and 2.F w . Thus, in addition to 
the faults that can cause the actual flow ratio to deviate, any faults that can invalidate these two 
virtual sensors would also cause the residual to be non-zero. 
For each pump head model, we can generate a residual for the pressure head prediction, similar 
to that of the pressure difference model: 
 i3 out n ) Drain pump 1A)( ) ( (pr P w P P   (7.13) 
 i4 out n ) Drain pump 1B)( ) ( (pr P w P P   (7.14) 
 i5 out n ) Drain pump 1C)( ) ( (pr P w P P   (7.15) 
The calculation of each of these residuals require three sensors for the flow rate w , suction 
pressure inP  and discharge pressure outP . By an abuse of notations, we have used the same 
variable labels for all three drain pumps. Each drain pump has a distinct set of sensors, as shown 
by the P&ID in Figure 7-1. 
For each of the two FWH models, in this demonstration we will focus on the condensing zone 
only as it is responsible for most of the heat transfer rate in the FWH. From the model prediction 
for the overall heat transfer coefficient of the condensing zone, we can generate one residual 
from each model: 
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where the notations for the T-H variables are as described for Eqns. (7.1) and (7.2). The label for 
each variable is based on the variable type and its location relatively to the attached FWH. It 
should be noted that although the variables in Eqns. (7.16) and (7.17) have the same labels, they 
are provided by a different set of sensors for each FWH. Here , ( , )
c h
c pUA w w  is the model 
prediction for the overall heat transfer coefficient of the condensing zone; cUA  is the value 
computed directly from its definition. In this demonstration, we will use the parametric model as 
expressed by Eqn. (7.4) for , ( , )
c h
c pUA w w . Considerations of more sophisticated models will be 
part of the future work. The calculation of each of these residuals requires six readings: 
feedwater flowrate cw , feedwater inlet temperature in
cT , outlet temperature out
cT , drain flowrate 
hw , steam inlet pressure in
hp , and drain temperature out
hT . Five of these six variables can be 
obtained from physical sensors while the flowrate cw  will be provided by a virtual sensor. 
Recall that the feedwater flowrate virtual sensors for FWHs 1A and 1B, 1.F w  and 2.F w , can be 
obtained from solving the system of five equations in (7.10). These are type I virtual sensors. 
For the purpose of residual generation, we can also use the prediction of the flow ratio model 
FR-1 to compute these feedwater flowrates thus obtain two type II virtual sensors that can be 
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where the fault-free ratio is the prediction of the flow ratio model. The solution of these two 
equations give us the two type II virtual sensors that can be used as alternative to the two type I 
virtual sensors obtained from solving (7.10). When the system is fault-free, the solutions of 
(7.10) and (7.18) agree, i.e. the value of each type II virtual sensor is equivalent to its 
corresponding type I virtual sensor.  
 95
However, notice that the validity conditions of the balance equations in (7.18) are not the same 
as those for the equations in (7.10). It follows that the validity conditions of the type II virtual 
sensors are different from those of the type I virtual sensors. A sensor fault for the inlet 
temperature of FWH 1B would violate the fifth equation in (7.10) thus invalidate the solutions 
for the two type I virtual sensors but it would not affect the equations in (7.18). 
Using the type II virtual sensors for the feedwater flowrate, denoted by cIIw , we can generate two 
additional residuals for FWHs 1A and 1B: 
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Note the distinction between the residual 6r  in Eqn. (7.16) where a type I virtual sensor is used 
for the flowrate cw  and 8r  where a type II virtual sensor is used instead. Recall the dependency 
structure of each residual as shown by the flowchart in Figure 6-2. For this example, these two 
residuals, 6r  and 8r , have different dependency structures although they were computed from the 
same model. Similarly, the same applies for 7r  and 9r . 
Table 7-2. Model residuals for the high-pressure feedwater system. 
Residual Model Sensors Formula 
1r  DP-1 Inlet, outlet pressure, flowrate (7.11) 
2r  FR-1 Two virtual flowrates (7.12) 
3r  SDP-1A Inlet, outlet pressure, flowrate (7.13) 
4r  SDP-1B Inlet, outlet pressure, flowrate (7.14) 
5r  SDP-1C Inlet, outlet pressure, flowrate (7.15) 
6r  FWH-1A Five physical sensors, 1 type I VS (7.16) 
7r  FWH-1B Five physical sensors, 1 type I VS (7.17) 
8r  FWH-1A Five physical sensors, 1 type II VS (7.19) 
9r  FWH-1B Five physical sensors, 1 type II VS (7.20) 
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7.4 Diagnostic Results 
To demonstrate the diagnostic process, we will use simulation data obtained from a Dymola 
model developed at Argonne National Laboratory [97]. A start-up procedure was simulated, and 
the simulation data was used for the calibration of the seven models listed in Table 7-1. 
Afterwards, various scenarios of faults were simulated and investigated. In this section, we will 
consider a case of fouling in one of the FWHs and a case of sensor faults. 
7.4.1 Fault Scenarios 
To clarify the diagnostic process, let us first consider the fault scenarios without measurement 
uncertainty.  
Fouling in FWH 1A 
For a case of fouling in FWH 1A, the residuals were computed and plotted in Figure 7-5. 
 
Figure 7-5. Fouling in FWH 1A causes two non-zero residuals (right plot) while the other seven remain 
unaffected (left plot). 
The fouling fault, started at time step 1000, causes two non-zero residuals, 6r  and 8r , which were 
computed from the heat transfer model for FWH 1A. Notice that when the system is fault-free, 
all nine residuals are all approximately zero, indicating that the modeling uncertainty in each 
model is negligible. This is because the simulation was performed in Dymola which, for its 1-D 
T-H component models, uses similar pressure drop and heat transfer correlations to the ones that 
were based on for the development of the physics-based parametric models in this thesis. The 
simulation results are therefore in good agreement with the diagnostic models.  
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Furthermore, on the right plot of Figure 7-5, the residual 6r  is shown to be nearly identical to 8r . 
This is expected since the fouling fault does not affect any balance equations. The solutions of 
(7.10) for the type I virtual sensors are equivalent to the solution of (7.18) for the type II virtual 
sensors and thus, the value of 6r  and 8r  are equivalent. 
To show the effect of the fouling fault, the outlet feedwater temperature, F1.T, from FWH 1A is 
plotted on Figure 7-6 in comparison with the temperature, F2.T, from FWH 1B.  
 
Figure 7-6. Effect of fouling on the feedwater outlet temperature of FWH 1A 
To perform the reasoning process, we have the option to use either the probabilistic reasoning 
framework in Chapter 5 or one of the deterministic reasoning approaches described in Chapter 
4. Without measurement and modeling uncertainty, there is no benefit in using probabilistic 
reasoning. In the deterministic reasoning approaches, we first need to detect non-zero residuals 
and then apply either the MBD reasoning framework in Table 2-1 (Deterministic I) or the FDI 
reasoning framework in Table 2-2 (Deterministic II). 
The task of change detection in this case is trivial. The observed fault symptoms are the two non-
zero residuals ( 6r  and 8r ). All other residuals are zero. With the structure of all residuals known, 
we can apply the FDI reasoning framework similarly to the process described in detail for the 
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single-phase heat exchanger example. The valid minimal diagnoses are fouling in FWH 1A or 
sensor fault for the steam pressure of FWH 1A. 
 
Table 7-3. Diagnostic result for the case of fouling in FWH 1A 
Fault symptoms Diagnoses 
6r  and 8r  non-zero [Fouling in FWH 1A] or 
[Pressure sensor fault at FWH 1A steam inlet] 
 
More specifically, recall the dependency of each residual listed in Table 7-2. From residual 6r  
being non-zero, one can obtain a conflict implicating either fouling or leakage in FWH 1A, a 
sensor fault among the five involved physical sensors or invalidity of the type I virtual sensor for 
the flowrate F1.w. Similarly, 6r  being non-zero provides a conflict implicating either fouling or 
leakage in FWH 1A, a sensor fault among the five involved physical sensors or invalidity of the 
type II virtual sensor for F1.w. 
Using the notion of exoneration with the zero residuals, one can then exonerate most of the faults 
from the two conflicts and is left with only two possibilities of either fouling in FWH 1A or a 
sensor fault in the steam inlet pressure of FWH 1A. Both these faults can directly cause 6r  and 8r  
to be non-zero and in this case, we cannot differentiate between the two faults. 
For this system, the number of possible faults is much higher than the number of fault symptoms. 
Under such condition, as discussed in Chapter 2, without the notion of exoneration, the 
diagnostic result using the MBD reasoning framework (Deterministic I) often consists of too 
many possibilities, thus is not suitable for practice uses. For most cases in practice when 
considering both component faults and sensor faults, we will use only either Deterministic II or 
probabilistic reasoning. 
Sensor Fault at E2.T 
The second fault scenario we will consider is a temperature sensor fault at the feedwater inlet of 
FWH 1B. The sensor fault is simulated by a bias, increasing over time, added to its reading 
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value. Reading values from the faulted sensor is plotted in Figure 7-7. The residuals in this 
scenario were computed and plotted in Figure 7-8. The sensor fault causes four non-zero 
residuals: 2r , 6r , 7r  and 9r . 
A fault in sensor E2.T directly affect the calculation of the heat transfer model in FWH 1B, 
causing both 7r  and 9r  to be non-zero. Additionally, the sensor fault violates the fifth balance 
equations in Eqn. (7.10). Thus, the two type I virtual sensors obtained by solving 7.10 are invalid 
which results in 2r , residual for the flow rate ratio, and 6r , residual for FWH 1A, as both are 
computed using at least one type I virtual sensor.  
 
Figure 7-7. A simulated fault for the feedwater inlet temperature sensor of FWH 1B 
 
Figure 7-8. Sensor fault at E2.T causes four non-zero residuals (right plot). 
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Applying the FDI reasoning framework for the Deterministic II approach, the diagnostic result 
for this set of fault symptoms are listed in Table 7-4. In this case, the diagnostic result includes 
one component fault, leakage from the shell of FWH 1B, or one of the four sensor faults. The 
available sensor set does not allow us to differentiate between the true fault, which is sensor 
E2.T, from the other four faults. 
Table 7-4. Diagnostic result for the case of sensor E2.T fault 
Fault symptoms Diagnoses 
2r , 6r , 7r  and 9r  
non-zero 
[Leakage from the FWH 1B shell] or 
[Sensor fault E2.T] or 
[Sensor fault F2.T] or 
[Sensor fault G2.w] or 
[Sensor fault G2.T] 
 
7.4.2 Effects of Uncertainty 
To investigate the effect of measurement uncertainty, we will add Gaussian noise to each 
variable of the simulation output. The measurement uncertainty of each sensor depends on the 
sensor type. The two common types of temperature sensors in nuclear systems are resistance 
temperature detectors (RTDs) and thermocouples. Typical RTDs have an accuracy of around 
0.3o C while thermocouples have a lower accuracy of up to 2.2o C  or 0.75% . Flowrate and 
pressure readings are provided by pressure transmitters typically with an accuracy of 0.25%  for 
high precision sensors and up to 1.25%  for others [100]. Sensors can be sampled every second 
or minute. 
For the current application, we are interested in faults of slow-degradation type and thus, only 
need to run diagnostics on a longer timescale, e.g. once every hour or day. In that case, it is not 
necessary to process every data point as collected from the sensors. The general practice would 
be to take the moving average of a certain number of sensor data points as one data point for the 
diagnostic tool. Doing so would effectively reduce the measurement uncertainty in each data 
point. For this demonstration, we will assume an effective standard deviation of 0.1o C  for 
each temperature reading and 0.1%  for pressure and flowrate readings. It should be noted that 
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some sensors may have measurement errors in forms of bias, as opposed to white noise, which 
do not get canceled or reduced by averaging. We will be assuming all sensors have been 
calibrated initially such that the biases are negligible. The increasing of sensor bias over time 
will be recognized as a sensor fault. 
The distribution parameters of each residual computed from 500 fault-free data points are listed 
in Table 7-5. 
Table 7-5. Mean and standard deviation of each residual when the system is fault-free 
Residual Mean Std. Dev. 
1r  
58.5 10  32.63 10  
2r  
44.7 10  37.35 10  
3r  
62.5 10  31.99 10  
4r  
51.6 10  31.94 10  
5r  
41.6 10  31.82 10  
6r  
41.0 10  21.28 10  
7r  
43.4 10  21.27 10  
8r  
43.2 10  21.41 10  
9r  
45.4 10  21.37 10  
 
The mean values of all nine residuals are close to zero when the system is fault-free. Notice that 
the standard deviations of the four FWH performance residuals 6r  to 9r  are significantly higher 
than the other five residuals. That is expected since the calculation of those residuals involve 
more sensors. 
For the case of fouling in FWH 1A, from the results in Section 7.4.1, we expect the two residuals 
6r  and 8r  to be affected. In the presence of uncertainty, the plots of 6r  and 8r  are shown in 
Figure 7-9. Measurement uncertainty from the involved sensors combined in the uncertainty of 
each residual.  
To detect non-zero residual, we will be using the GLR-D change detection tool whose decision 
function was provided in Eqn. (4.2). The decision functions for all nine residuals in this case are 




Figure 7-9. The two noisy non-zero residuals under the effect fouling in FWH 1A 
 
Figure 7-10. GLR-D decision functions for residual evaluation in the case of fouling in FWH 1A 
It is clear that after both 6r  and 8r  can be observed to be non-zero given enough wait-time while 
the other residuals are observed to be zero. For this set of observed fault symptoms, the 
diagnostic result by the Deterministc II approach was discussed in the last section and 
summarized in Table 7-3. The two possibilities are fouling in FWH 1A and pressure sensor fault 
at the inlet of FWH 1A. 
For the case of a sensor fault at E2.T as discussed in the last section, plots of the residuals 
affected by the fault are shown in Figure 7-11. 
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Figure 7-11. The four residuals affected by the temperature sensor fault at the feedwater inlet of FWH 1B 
It can be observed from Figure 7-11 that the sensitivity of residual 7r  to the sensor fault is 
significantly lower compared to the other three residuals. The GLR-D decision functions for this 
case are plotted in Figure 7-12.  
 
Figure 7-12. GLR-D decision functions in residual evaluation for the case of sensor fault at E2.T 
Note that the sensor drift starts at time step 500. From Figure 7-12, 2r  can be observed to be non-
zero starting at time step 520, 6r and 9r  starting at step 540 while the change in residual 7r  goes 
undetected until around time step 650. Prior to timestep 650, because of the lower sensitivity of 
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7r  to the fault, the change detection tool fails to detect the non-zero residual – a scenario we 
referred to as a false negative. 
In the Deterministic II, the FDI reasoning framework is applied using the observations of non-
zero and zero residuals from the change detection tool. The change detection results and the 
corresponding diagnostic results are summarized in Table 7-6. 





520t   No non-zero residual No fault. 
35 0 42 5t   2r  No valid diagnosis. 
75 3 44 6t   2r , 6r , 9r  No valid diagnosis. 
647t   2r , 6r , 7r , 9r  
[Leakage from the FWH 1B shell] or 
[Sensor fault E2.T] or 
[Sensor fault F2.T] or 
[Sensor fault G2.w] or 
[Sensor fault G2.T] 
 
Prior to time step 647, one or more affected residuals are undetected and the Deterministic II 
fails to find a valid diagnosis. It should be noted that in this case, as shown in Figure 7-7, the 
sensor bias increases over time, thus the effect in 7r  is eventually detected. For a small shift of 
the bias, the change in 7r  may not be detected because of its lower sensitivity to the fault. 
This example showed that the Deterministic II approach is susceptible to false detections, a 
limitation we also discussed in Section 4.4. The deterministic reasoning framework may fail to 
find a valid diagnosis in case of one or more false positive or false negative by the change 
detection tool. In the presence of uncertainty, some of the residuals with lower sensitivity may 
not be detected until the fault becomes sufficiently significant. This issue effectively limits the 
diagnostic sensitivity. In Chapter 5, the probabilistic reasoning framework was developed to deal 
with this difficulty, i.e. to account for the possibility of false positive and false negative. 
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To apply the probabilistic framework, as described in Chapter 5, the first step is to construct a 
Bayesian network to represent the dependency between faults and residuals. The Bayesian 
network for this case is shown in Figure 7-13. Each number on the first layer represents a distinct 
fault. The list of faults is provided in Appendix C. In particular, number 1 is fouling in FWH 1A 
and 15 is the sensor fault at E2.T. The residual for the head model of each drain pump, 3r , 4r , 
and 5r ,  is independent from the rest the of the system. Thus, each drain pump can be represented 
by a separated Bayesian network with four independent faults: a pump fault and three sensor 
faults. 
 
Figure 7-13. A Bayesian network for the high pressure feedwater system. 
To define the structure of the network, we need to provide the prior probability of each fault and 
the conditional probability tables for the residuals and change detection observations. We will 
assume a prior probability of 10%  for fouling, 1%  for leakage, 5%  blockage and 5%  for 
sensor faults. 
As with the example of the single-phase heat exchanger, to simplify the calculation, we will 
apply the same assumptions used for the notion of exoneration: each fault affects every residual 
it is involved in. The conditional probability ( | )P r F  is then simply given by: 
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 all parents node = 1) = 1.0( 0 |iP r   (7.21) 
 any parent node = 1) = 1.0( 1|iP r   (7.22) 
Suppose that the detection threshold has been chosen such that the false positive rate is 0.1% and 
the false negative rate is 1.0%, thus: 
 1| ) 0.001( 0i iP O r   (7.23) 
 10 | ) 0.0( 1i iOP r    (7.24) 
After the structure of the network has been defined, we can then compute the posterior 
probability of each fault given a set of observations. Prior to time step 520, all residuals are 
observed to be zero and no fault is detected.  
Between time step 520 and 543, only 2r  is observed to be non-zero. The posterior probability of 
every fault is approximately zero and no fault is detected. The non-zero value of 2r  is interpreted 
as a false positive by the change detection tool. 
Between time step 543 to 647, 2r , 6r , and 9r  are observed to be non-zero. Results of fault 
posterior probabilities for this case are listed in the third column of Table 7-7. Notice that the 
values found for fouling in FWH 1B (10.1% ) and sensor fault D2.P ( 5.0% ) are just the prior 
probability provided for the faults. The evidence, 2r , 6r , 9r  being non-zero, neither implicates 
nor exonerates these faults. The faults with significant posterior probability are the four sensors 
faults, in E2.T, F2.T, G2.T and G2.T, and leakage from the shell side of FWH 1B. This is the 
result found by the Deterministic II approach after time step 647 as listed in Table 7-6. The 
distinction between the sensor faults and the leakage is because of the difference in prior 
probability. The sensor faults are more likely than the leakage. Here, by using the probabilistic 
reasoning framework, we obtain the correct diagnostic result even when the change in residual 7r  
is undetected. 
After time step 647, 7r  is observed to be non-zero in addition to 2r , 6r , 9r . The results are listed 
in the fourth column in Table 7-7. The addition of 7r  to the evidence does not significantly 
change the posterior probabilities. The faults with significant posterior probability are the four 
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sensor faults and FWH 1B shell leakage, in agreement with the result in Table 7-4 for the ideal 
case of no uncertainty. One can conclude the sensor faults are more likely than the leakage but, 
because of the limitation of the current sensor set, cannot differentiate between the four sensor 
faults.  
Table 7-7. Fault posterior probabilities by the probabilistic reasoning framework for the case of a sensor 
fault at E2.T 
Fault ID Fault 
Symptoms 
2r , 6r , 9r  2r , 6r , 7r , 9r  
15 Sensor E2.T 25.7%  25.8%  
16 Sensor F2.T 25.7%  25.8%  
17 Sensor G2.w 25.7%  25.8%  
18 Sensor G2.T 25.7%  25.8%  
5 FWH 1B, Fouling 10.1%  10.1%  
7 FWH 1B, Shell leak. 5.1%  5.2%  
19 Sensor D2.P 5.0%  5.0%  









8.1 Summary  
The study in this thesis focused on the application of diagnostic methods to the problem of 
monitoring equipment health and sensor calibration status in nuclear engineering systems. The 
research is motivated by the ongoing effort to utilize automation and operator support 
technologies for cost reduction in nuclear power plants. The task of detecting equipment 
performance degradation can be automated by a diagnostic framework which make use of 
measurement data from instruments that are already in place for system monitoring. Given the 
long-time scale over which component degradation typically proceeds, some of the system 
monitoring sensors may also inevitably degrade and become unreliable. The human resources 
required to detect and recalibrate faulty sensors contribute a significant fraction to the overall 
O&M cost.  
The objective of this thesis was the development of a diagnostic framework for thermal-
hydraulic systems in commercial nuclear power plants, capable of dealing with both equipment 
faults and instrument faults. The principal target application for the approach developed here is 
for immediate implementation in currently operating nuclear power plants, however the methods 
developed here also would potentially have application for the design and operation of advanced 
nuclear reactor systems. In order to detect slow performance degradation and sensor drift, a high 
detection sensitivity is needed while the plant may undergo changes in operating conditions and 
the sensor data are subject to noise and uncertainty. For that purpose, the diagnostic framework 
needs to be insensitive in changes of boundary conditions and the various sources of uncertainty. 
Other challenging issues for the research problem include the lack of sensors that can be used for 
the specific diagnostic purposes. 
Chapter 8  
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work 
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The theoretical framework proposed in this thesis is a hybrid of quantitative model-based 
diagnosis, statistical change detection and probabilistic reasoning. Given the need for the 
diagnostic tool to be insensitive to operating condition changes under plant drifts, a physics-
based approach was developed. In the framework of model-based diagnosis, physics-based 
models are used to describe the fault-free behavior of T-H components. Quantitative model 
residuals can be generated from the analytical redundancy relations provided by the fault-free 
component models. Non-zero model residuals serve as fault symptoms for the reasoning process 
in the model-based diagnosis framework developed here.  
The presence of measurement and modeling uncertainty affects both the residual evaluation as 
well as the reasoning processes. A statistical change detection tool is necessary to detect whether 
a model residual is statistically zero or non-zero. Consequently, there is an associated false 
detection rate when each residual is detected to be zero or non-zero. If the false detection rates 
can be considered negligible, conventional deterministic reasoning frameworks can be applied to 
obtain possible fault diagnoses from a set observed fault symptoms. However, when false 
detection rates are significant, e.g. in the case of large modeling uncertainty, the deterministic 
reasoning frameworks may fail to produce valid diagnoses. The probabilistic reasoning 
framework using the method of Bayesian network was proposed to deal with such scenarios by 
considering the possibility of false observations in the reasoning process for fault diagnosis. 
The construction of physics-based models requires the decomposition of each T-H system into 
separate components of known generic types. Physics-based models are developed for each 
generic component type in the form of parametric models. Each model may contain some 
unknown parameters which are determined for each specific component during the model 
calibration process. A training data set from measurement data of the process variables on the 
boundary of the component is required for this process. Thus, each component model has a 
minimum sensor requirement for the calibration process that must be performed. For most T-H 
systems in currently operating nuclear power plants, the available sensor set is limited and 
insufficient for model construction of standalone components. In this thesis, the lack of sufficient 
sensors is mitigated by the introduction of the concept of virtual sensors. Relations between 
different components and sensors at the system level are utilized to solve for the missing 
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variables required for model construction. At the same time, the search for available models is 
expanded to cover multiple nearby components as allowed by the sensor set. 
The proposed diagnostic framework was automated in a Python test implementation. In Chapter 
8, the implementation was applied to a typical high-pressure feedwater system to demonstrate its 
capability. With the exception of a pressure head model for each drain pump, it was not possible 
to construct standalone component models for the major components in the system with the 
current sensor set.  Most notably this was the case for the feedwater heaters (FWH) and steam 
generator feed pumps. By utilizing system balance equations, the missing feedwater flowrate 
sensors for the two first-point FWHs were computed from the other available sensors. The 
solutions of the balance equations, which we referred to as virtual sensors, was used in the 
construction of two FWH models. Furthermore, various aggregate models for pressure loss, flow 
rate ratio were created as listed in Table 7-1. Residuals were then generated from the models. In 
order to perform diagnosis at the system level it was necessary to keep track of the dependency 
of each residual on the involved components, on the sensors and on underlying assumptions for 
the system balance equations. 
Results for the case of feedwater heater fouling and for the case of a sensor fault were 
investigated and the results were shown in Section 7.4.1. Useful results were obtained for each 
scenario, however, due to the limitation of the available sensor set, there were multiple valid 
diagnoses for each case, and it was not possible to always identify a unique diagnosis. 
The effects of measurement uncertainty were demonstrated in Section 7.4.2. In the presence of 
measurement and modeling uncertainty, there is an inevitable delay in the time it takes for a non-
zero residual to be detected. Depending on the sensitivity of each residual to each fault, some of 
the mathematically affected residuals were not always detected. In Table 7-6, an example was 
shown of a case in which it was not possible to provide a valid diagnosis when the change 
detection tool failed to detect one of the non-zero residuals. Such issues limit the diagnostic 
sensitivity and reliability of deterministic approaches in the case of significant uncertainty. The 
limitation can be overcome by the use of probabilistic reasoning approaches and results using 
probabilistic reasoning based on a Bayesian network were shown in Table 7-7. The correct 
diagnostic result was obtained even when one of the affected residuals was undetected.  
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The most significant original contribution of this thesis to the field is the development of a 
physics-based probabilistic framework for fault diagnostics of T-H systems with limited 
instrumentation in nuclear power plants. The integration of model-based diagnosis with 
probabilistic reasoning at system level is possible due to the physics-based approach in model 
construction and residual generation. From the underlying analytical relations, each residual can 
be directly linked to various component and sensors faults at system level. The use of physics-
based models for quantitative model-based diagnosis allows the proposed framework to be less 
sensitive to possible changes of operating conditions and capable of dealing with both 
component faults and sensor faults. The relations between different system components, 
represented by conservation laws, are utilized through the concept of virtual sensors and 
aggregate models to effectively reduce the number of sensors required for each component and 
provide a more detailed diagnosis. Modeling and measurement uncertainty are robustly dealt 
with by statistical change detection and probabilistic reasoning.  
8.2 Future Work 
The focus of this thesis has been the development of a diagnostic framework applicable to 
complex engineering systems with a limited sensor set. Diagnostic results for each system were 
produced consistent with the best spatial resolution permitted by the available sensor set. The 
diagnostic benefit from each possible new sensor can be systematically analyzed from the effects 
of the addition to each step of the framework by using the model construction to residual 
generation and reasoning developed in this work. Thus, the physics-based framework as 
formulated provides a straightforward transition to the ‘inverse problem’ of determining optimal 
placement for new sensors for a given monitoring need. Solving the inverse problem considering 
both technical and economic aspects will be an important part of the future application of this 
work. 
The reliability of model-based diagnosis depends on the quality of the models being used. High 
modeling uncertainty may lead to unreliable or false diagnoses. The difficulty in developing 
models with tolerable uncertainty for complex technical processes is one of the limitations of 
model-based diagnosis. In this work, models of T-H components were constructed in a physics-
based approach and thus are less data-dependent.   The effects of uncertainty were robustly 
treated using a probabilistic framework. Nevertheless, the model construction process requires 
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simplifications of the underlying physics which inevitably lead to intrinsic modeling uncertainty. 
As possible direction for future work in the modeling aspect of the work here is to utilize the 
design parameters available for each component and investigate the use of high-fidelity 
simulation codes to construct simulation-based surrogate models. 
The proposed framework has been formulated to consist of separated steps and allow various 
methods in each step to be interchangeable. Specifically, for the reasoning process, one has the 
option to use one of the deterministic reasoning approaches or the probabilistic reasoning 
approach. Residuals are evaluated by statistical change detection tools whose outputs in the form 
of zero and non-zero residuals are usable by both deterministic reasoning and probabilistic 
reasoning approaches. In the presented probabilistic results for the heat exchanger example and 
the feedwater system, several assumptions were applied to simplify the estimation of the 
conditional probability tables. Such simplifications are justifiable for practical use if one is not 
particularly interested in the exact posterior probability of each fault but only needs rough 
estimation of the relative magnitude between faults. However, as discussed in Section 5.2, a  
more accurate estimation of the conditional probability tables can be obtained by sampling the 
underlying model. This will be part of the future work for the application of the probabilistic 
framework in predictive and preventative maintenance for nuclear systems.  
Finally, from a statistical point of view, potential conflicts arise in the factorization of the 
uncertainty treatment into two separated steps, a change detection step using the GLR test and a 
probabilistic reasoning step using Bayesian network. The former is a frequentist approach using 
likelihood ratio test while the latter is a Bayesian approach. As discussed, such separation is 
necessary to allow the reasoning approaches to be interchangeable. However, there are several 
Bayesian change detection methods available with comparable performance to the GLR tests 
[101, 102] and for future work, methods can be investigated to combine both steps of the change 
detection and reasoning into a dynamic Bayesian network to treat the effects of uncertainty in 
diagnosis.   
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As described in Chapter 3, physics-based models can be developed for each generic type of T-H 
components in form of parametric models. Each parametric model may contain several unknown 
parameters to be determined for each specific component in a process we referred to as model 
calibration. Details of the model calibration process are discussed in this appendix. 





j jy X 

   (A.1) 
where y  is the model output; 0  and j  are the model parameters; jX  are the input variables 
for the model; and p  is the number of distinct input variables. Each jX  could be from a 
different physical quantity or just a different power of the same physical variable. For example, 
for the model of the overall heat transfer coefficient in Eqn. (3.21), the jX ’s are 
0.8
cw
  and 0.8hw
 . 
The objective of the model calibration process is to determine the model parameters using a 
training data set.  
Each data point of the training set provides a value of y  for certain measured input jX . Let y  
be the column vector containing N  output from the training set; X  denotes the ( 1)N p   input 
matrix with each row representing the p  input variables for each training data point and a 1 in 
the first position. The model can be written in linear form as: 
 ˆ y X  (A.2) 
Appendix A  
Regression Methods for Model Calibration 
 114
where 0 1, , ,( ... )
T
p     is the parameter vector and ŷ  is the model prediction for the N  
training data points. We need to estimate the parameter vector   by fitting the model prediction 
ŷ  against the measured output y . The most common estimation method is least squares, in 
which the parameters are selected to minimize the sum of squares of the differences between ŷ  
and y , known as the residual sum of squares [86]: 
 
   








y y y y
y X y X
 (A.3) 
To minimize the residual sum of squares, we can now take the derivative w.r.t   and set it to 
zero to obtain a least square estimation of the model parameters: 
   1ˆ T T  X X X y  (A.4) 
Under the assumption that the observations iy  are uncorrelated and have a constant variance 
2 , 
the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is given by: 
   1 2ˆVar( ) T  X X  (A.5) 
where the variance 2  can be estimated from the observations by: 
 2
1











    (A.6) 
̂  is known as the residual standard error (RSE). The residual standard error could be used as an 
indicator for the accuracy of the model. However, as it is estimated from training data, the RSE 
could underestimate the model prediction uncertainty. The standard practice when there are 
sufficient data is to split a data set into three parts: a training set used to fit the models; a 
validation set used to estimate prediction error for model selection; and a test set used to access 
the prediction error of the final chosen model [86]. In the current application, a physics-based 
approach is used for model selection, thus, a validation set is not required but a test set is still 
preferred to estimate the prediction uncertainty. 
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As an example, consider the calibration process for a pressure head model for a pump. We will 
use the quadratic form from Eqn. (3.12): 
 2head 0 1 2P ww      (A.7) 
A set of real plant startup data for a feedwater pump is shown in Figure A-1 for the measured 
flowrate and Figure A-2 for the pressure head. 
 
Figure A-1. Flowrate for a feedwater pump during startup 
 
Figure A-2. Pressure head by the feedwater pump during startup 
The startup data set is split in to two data sets: a training set with 70% of the data and a test set 
from the rest. By fitting the model in Eqn. (A.7) against the training set, the estimated model 
parameters are listed in Table A-1. 
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Table A-8-1. Least squares estimation of the pressure head model parameters 
Model parameters Estimated Std. Err. 





( )P w  
0  1068.0   31.1  1007.1 1129.0  
1  0.025  1.019  1.974  2.025  
2  0.059  0.008  0.075  0.042  
 
The standard prediction error can be estimated from the test data set to be 1.30  (psi). A plot of 
the fitted model is shown in Figure A-3. 
 





In the presence of noise and uncertainty, a statistical treatment is needed to evaluate the residuals 
in order to determine if a residual has become non-zero. In this appendix, statistical change point 
detection methods are discussed, and the most suitable method is selected for the current 
application. 
In the problem of statistical change point detection (CPD), one aims to detect whether a process 
or a random variable has deviated from its normal behavior, i.e. if there is a change in the 
underlying distribution. Based on the conditions of the target application, we will assume 
distribution parameters of a process variable in its normal state (in control) are known or can be 
estimated but the distribution after a change (out of control) is unknown. 
We are interested in detecting a change of mean value. The variance or standard deviation is 
assumed to remain the same. In general, a change in process mean can occur in two ways: 
 Shift: At the changepoint, the process mean abruptly shifts to a different value and stays 
there after the change. 
 Drift: At the changepoint, the process mean starts drifting gradually from the original 
value. For the problem of on-line change detection, one aims to minimize the detection 
delay, i.e. the time between the changepoint and detection point. In that period, it will be 
assumed that the drift is linear. 
The two change modes are illustrated in Figure B-1. The primary objective for applying a CPD 
method is to detect a change as soon as possible, i.e. minimizing the delay between change time 
and detection time. A secondary objective, which may or may not be possible depending on the 
method, is to estimate the time and amplitude of the change. 
Appendix B  
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Figure B-1. A shift in process mean (left) and a drift in process mean (right) 
 
B. 1 Overview 
Since the distribution parameters after a change are unknown, some of the most well-developed 
CPD methods, including the CUSUM method, are not applicable [15]. Some of the possible 
options are: 
 Shewhart control chart 
 Exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) control chart 
 Generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) tests 
The Shewhart control chart [89, 88] is a statistical process control tool designed to determine if a 
process has gone out of control, i.e. has deviated from its expected behavior. It is formulated as a 
limit-checking detector: a process is considered out of control when its deviation from the 
expected mean value exceeds the limits set based on the expected standard deviation. The 
Shewhart control chart is easier to implement and useful for detection of large shift in mean 
value but it offers no way of estimating the change magnitude or locating the change point. Also, 
it has proved to be less effective for detecting small shift or drift. 
In a similar manner, the EWMA control chart operates by setting upper and lower limits based 
on the standard deviation but like the name suggested, it use exponentially weighted moving 
average values of the process instead of directly measured values in the limit checking process. 
Recent observations have higher weights in the considerations. The EWMA method can be used 
to detect both shift and drift changes in mean value [90]. 
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Another method which can be formulated specifically for the detection of both shift and drift 
changes is the GLR tests. Furthermore, it also provides estimations of the change magnitude and 
change time. Previous studies have shown that the GLR method when set up properly can 
provide the best overall performance in term of detection delay and parameter estimations, i.e. 
change time and change magnitude [89, 91]. The methodology of the GLR method will be 
summarized in the remaining of this section. 
Consider a statistical process, i.e. a series of sequentially sampled data, which is expected to 
have constant mean and standard deviation values under normal behavior (in-control). For each 
time step when a new data point is sampled, we are interested in detecting whether the mean 
value of the process has changed. We assume the process can be described by a normal 
(Gaussian) distribution whose mean and standard deviation are known or can be estimated. 


















Given a sequence of observed data and a statistical model of the distribution, the likelihood 
function represents the plausibility of the model. In other words, the higher the likelihood 
function, the more likely that the statistical model is correct. Given two hypotheses, or two 
different models, of a distribution, the ratio of the likelihood functions can be used to decide on 
which hypothesis is more likely to be true. For a sequence of independently observed data, the 
likelihood function is the product of the likelihood on each data point. For the Gaussian 

















B.2 Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) 
Consider a series of sequentially sampled data  ky . For each time step when a new data point is 
sampled, a decision rule is computed to test between two hypotheses:  
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 0H : There has been no change. The distribution parameter is given by defined by 
0 0 0 )( ,    
 1H : There was a change point happened at some time step j , after the change point, 
distribution parameter has changed to 1  
 
We have assumed that the model parameters 0 0( , )   for the null hypothesis 0H , i.e the 
distribution before any change occurs, are known. If the parameter after change, 1 , is also 
known, the decision can be made based on the likelihood ratio between the two distributions. 
If the parameter after change is unknown, however, the ratio test cannot be performed. One 
solution as proposed by Wald [19,20] is to replace the unknown parameter 1  by its maximum 









   (B.3) 
If  ˆ 1N  , the likelihood of the null hypothesis 0H  is larger than the maximum likelihood of the 
hypothesis 1H  and therefore one can select 0H  and conclude that there has been no change. 
Otherwise, a change can be reported with its location determined by the maximum of the 
likelihood of 1H . 
In 1H , we assume a change point happened at time index j  after which the model parameter 
changed to 1 . For time index 1 to 1j  , both 0H  and 1H  assume the same model parameter ( 0
) and thus the likelihood ratio during this period cancels out. The log-likelihood ratio given 
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  (B.4) 
The log likelihood ratio, 1)(
k
jS  , is a function of two variables: the change time j  and the model 
parameter value after change to 1 . These two parameters are selected to maximize the log 














  (B.5) 
The maximum log-likelihood ratio kg  is used as the decision function for the GLR test at time 
step k . Hypothesis 1H , with optimal parameters ˆkj  and 1,ˆ k  to maximize 1)(
k
jS  , is accepted if 
the decision function kg  exceeds a pre-defined threshold h . Otherwise, 0H  is accepted and no 
change is reported. 
For detection of changes in process mean, the GLR test has been commonly used to detect 
sustained shift [89]. For better estimations of the change point and change magnitude, the GLR 
test can be formulated specifically for each change model, i.e. sustained shift and linear drift. 
GLR change detection formulation for linear drifts were presented by Fahmy and Elsayed [92] 
and Wang et al. [93]. 
B.2.1 GLR Test for Sustained Shift in Process Mean (GLR-S) 
For a Gaussian process, the model parameters are mean value μ and standard deviation σ. We 
will assume the standard deviation to remain the same even after a shift in process mean. The 






































The log-likelihood ratio for observations up to time k  after a changepoint at j  is: 
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   (B.8) 
Take derivative with respect to 1  and set it to zero to obtain the optimal value of 1  that 
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 
    (B.10) 
A change is detected when decision function kg  exceeds a pre-defined threshold h . The process 
mean after the change can then be estimated using Eqn. (B.9) with the change point j  
determined by maximizing Eqn. (B.10). 
B.2.2 GLR Test for Linear Drift in Process Mean (GLR-D) 
For the case with a drift in process mean, we assume that the change starts exactly at the end a 
time step. Wang et al. [93] considered a more general case in which the change could occur 
during a time step but the difference in performance was shown to be negligible. With the 
change in process mean modeled by a linear drift of rate   per time step, starting at time index 
j , the process mean and the probability density at time index i j  are given by: 






















  (B.12) 
The log-likelihood ratio at time step k  after a drift starting at j : 
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A change is detected when decision function kg  exceeds a pre-defined threshold h . The drift 
rate can then be estimated using Eqn. (B.14) with the change point j  determined by maximizing 
Eqn. (B.15). 
B.2.3 Examples 
The GLR-S and GLR-D tests are formulated specifically for the detection and estimation of 
changes by shift and drift in process mean, respectively. Previous studies have shown that both 
tests perform equally well in term of detection delay when applied to either type of change in 
process mean [93]. The advantage of specializing a test for each type of change is realized in 
change magnitude estimation. It should be expected that the GLR-S, formulated for predicting 
shift change, will not perform well in estimating the drift change and vice versa. To demonstrate 
the difference between the two formulations, consider an example with a series of observations 
which can be described by a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation 0 . Starting at 
500t s , the process mean is subjected to a shift of 0  . The decision functions for the 
GLR-S and GLR-D tests are plotted in Figure B-2 with the decision threshold selected albitrary 
at 7.5h  . It can be observed from Figure B-22 that both tests have similar performance in 




Figure B-2. Decision function by GLR-S and GLR-D for a shift in process mean of     
 
After a change is detected, that is when the decision function exceeds the threshold, the GLR 
tests can also provide estimated values for the change point location and the change magnitude. 
The estimations of change point location by GLR-S and GLR-D for the case above are plotted in 
Figure B-3. Note that the change point estimation is to be disregarded until a change is reported 
when the decision function reaches its threshold. Figure B-3 shows that for the case of a shift in 
mean value, the GLR-S can provide a good estimation of the change point location while the 
GLR-D test cannot, which is expected. 
 
Figure B-3. Estimation of change point location by GLR tests for a shift of     
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B.2.4 Decision threshold 
The decision threshold h  for the change detection algorithm can be set based on a pre-defined 
false alarm rate, i.e the probability for the change detection algorithm to incorrectly detect a 
change even though the process variable is still in its normal distribution 
For a given threshold for the decision function, the false alarm rate can be estimated by the 
inverse of the average run length (ARL). When the process variable is still in control, the average 
run length is defined as the average number of samples evaluated (the number of times the 
decision function is checked against the detection threshold) before a change is detected, which 
count as a false alarm since the variable is still in the distribution for its normal behavior. 
For the GLR tests, it may be too computationally costly to use all the history data to compute the 
decision function. Instead, the algorithm can be run using only a number of m   most recent data 
points. The average run length, and the false alarm rate, depend slightly on m . 
The average run length or false alarm rate can be estimate by sampling the decision function  
using the normal behavior distribution of the process variable. Figure B-4 show the distribution 
of the decision function for the GLRS algorithm with 200m  , obtained by sampling 610  data 
points of a normalized normal distribution.  
 
Figure B-4. Probability density function of the GLRS decision function 
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From the probability density function of the decision function, the average run length and the 
false alarm rate can be estimated, which are plotted on Figures B-5 and B-6, respectively. For 
example, the ARL corresponding to a 0.1%  false alarm rate is 1000 and the threshold needed is 
approximately 8.36 . 
 
Figure B-5. ARL of the GLRS algorithm as a function of decision threshold. 
 
Figure B-6. GLRS false alarm rate as a function of decision threshold. 
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A list of faults for the high-pressure feedwater system considered in Chapter 7 and identified in 
Section 7.4.2 is provided in Table C-1. Note that here we have neglected the possibilities of 
piping leakage and blockage but the addition of such faults into the framework is 
straightforward.  
For the probabilistic reasoning results in Section 7.4.2, we have only considered the first 27 
faults that are relevant to the six residuals 1r , 2r , 6r , 7r , 8r , and 9r . The residuals computed from 
the pressure head models for the drain pumps, 7r , 8r , and 9r , are independent from those six 
residuals and only depend on the pump fault and sensor faults at the inlet and outlet of each 
pump. 
More specifically, since a standalone pressure 
head model can be constructed for each of the 
drain pumps, the residual for each drain pump is 
independent from the rest of the system. To 
perform probabilistic reasoning for each drain 
pump, we can construct a Bayesian network that 
consist of only the pump fault and three sensor 
faults around the pump. An example is shown in 




Appendix C  
List of Faults for the HP Feedwater System 
Figure C-1. A Bayesian network for drain pump 1A 
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Table C-1. List of faults for the high-pressure feedwater system 
ID Comp. Label Comp. Type Fault 
1 1-FW-E-1A FWH Fouling 
2 1-FW-E-1A FWH Tube leak 
3 1-FW-E-1A FWH Shell leak 
4 1-FW-E-1A FWH Tube block 
5 1-FW-E-1B FWH Fouling 
6 1-FW-E-1B FWH Tube leak 
7 1-FW-E-1B FWH Shell leak 
8 1-FW-E-1B FWH Tube block 
9 FE-105 Flow sensor Sensor fault 
10 FW-TE-109A Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
11 FW-TE-110A Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
12 SD-FT-102A Flow sensor Sensor fault 
13 SD-TE-110A Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
14 ES-PT-100A Press. sensor Sensor fault 
15 FW-TE-109B Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
16 FW-TE-110B Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
17 SD-FT-102B Flow sensor Sensor fault 
18 SD-TE-110B Temp. sensor Sensor fault 
19 ES-PT-100B Press. sensor Sensor fault 
20 FW-PT-158 Press. sensor Sensor fault 
21 PT-100 Press. sensor Sensor fault 
22 1-FW-P-1A Feed pump Pump fault 
23 1-FW-P-1B Feed pump Pump fault 
24 MOV-150A Valve Leakage 
25 MOV-150A Valve Blockage 
26 MOV-150B Valve Leakage 
27 MOV-150B Valve Blockage 
28 1-SD-P-1A Drain pump Pump fault 
29 1-SD-PT-100A Press. sensor Sensor fault 
30 1-SD-FT-100A Flow sensor Sensor fault 
31 1-SD-PT-108A Press. sensor Sensor fault 
32 1-SD-P-1B Drain pump Pump fault 
33 1-SD-PT-100B Press. sensor Sensor fault 
34 1-SD-FT-100B Flow sensor Sensor fault 
35 1-SD-PT-108B Press. sensor Sensor fault 
36 1-SD-P-1C Drain pump Pump fault 
37 1-SD-PT-100C Press. sensor Sensor fault 
38 1-SD-FT-100C Flow sensor Sensor fault 
39 1-SD-PT-108C Press. sensor Sensor fault 
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